A REVOLUÇÃO DOS CRAVOS: revolução e democracia, um debate

Abstract

In this article we make a systematization of the main features/causes of the Portuguese revolution and argue that social changes give rise to disruptions in governance, and that the inability to have institutional arrangements concerns the impossibility of combining political projects, which are unable to perform due to the dynamics of social movement, not its inverse. In the second part of the paper we analyse the impact of counter-revolutionary process -the social pact -started in November 1975. We argue that the social pact was born in 1975 and was consecrated in the 1976 Constitution, remaining because of the intense conflictuality inherited from revolution -10 governments in 10 years, between 1976 and 1985.Keywords: Carnation Revolution. Worker's control. Social movements. Contemporary Portugal.Resumen: En este articulo, hacemos una sistematización de las principales características causas de la revolución portuguesa, argumentando que son los cambios sociales que se encuentran en el origen de las rupturas gubernamentales y que la capacidad de haber acuerdos institucionales se aseguran con la imposibilidad de conjugación de proyectos políticos, imposibilitados en realizarse por la dinámica del movimiento social. La segunda parte del artículo es analizado el impacto del proceso contra revolucionario -el pacto social -iniciado a partir de noviembre de 1975. Es argumentado que el pacto social nació en 1975 y se quedó consagrado en la constitución de 1976, manteniéndose por causa de la

Accounting in the context of war: The Portuguese case of the ‘Guerra do Ultramar’ (1961–1974)

“…The concern of Salazar's government with the balance of public accounts was appreciable (Madeira, 2012); the war placed a huge burden on public finances (Simões, 2000; Varela, 2011). Although the costs were considerable, according to Mesquita (2011), there is evidence that the real financial costs were higher than those included in the budget.…”

“…The situation became so complicated that, in 1968, the Minister of Finance did not want to continue to have contact with the Ministry of the Army, believing that the army did not properly manage the funds it was allocated (Mesquita, 2011). By 1974, the Portuguese economy had entered a deficit regime (Varela, 2011). The war effort over nearly 14 years drove military spending to almost 40% of the total public expenditure of the state (Simões, 2000; Varela, 2011).…”

“…By 1974, the Portuguese economy had entered a deficit regime (Varela, 2011). The war effort over nearly 14 years drove military spending to almost 40% of the total public expenditure of the state (Simões, 2000; Varela, 2011). During the war, the economy entered a deficit regime with a negative balance in the general state budget (Mesquita, 2011; Simões, 2000; Varela, 2011).…”

Workers' control, the case of the Portuguese revolution

“…With few exceptions, it is possible to create a portrayal of workers' control in the revolution which it is divided essentially into three major periods: (a) atomized forms; (b) workers' control coordinated by sectors; (c) workers' control disseminated at the national level and coordinated in an embryonic form at district and national levels (Figures 1 and 2). 25 The Portuguese version of the "biennio rosso" was one of the uncommon circumstances in the history of postwar 20th century in which workers, and workers' control vied for power. We have suggested how worker self-management formulations-whereby the workers become totally or partially their own bosses-may not take up the issue of State Power.…”