A Review on Supply Chain Contracting with Information Considerations: Information Updating and Information Asymmetry

Shen, Bin; Choi, Tsan-Ming; Minner, Stefan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3060670

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Its apparatus can be used to analyze situations in order to make strategic decisions, competitiveness, "balance of interests", measure the level of risk and uncertainty, etc. Recent research includes the following: E. Adida and V. DeMiguel [1] conduct research on multi-production and retail chains; J. Chen and B. Chen [7] study the optimal policy of consumer involvement in competition; M. Esmaeili and all [9] study the optimal pricing solutions in closed supply chain systems; B. Shen and all [30] study the problem of coordination of the supply chain of two products; Zlotenko O. and all [34] study this issue in order to optimize the structure of funding sources; M. Hua and all [12] investigate the system of return channels using game theory.…”

Section: Review Of Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Interaction of State Institutions and Enterprises with Economic Security Positions in Digital Economy

Rudnichenko

Melnyk

Havlovska

et al. 2021

Wseas Transactions on Business and Economics

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The purpose of the study is to develop a model of the influence of state institutions on the enterpriseeconomic security system of using the provisions of game theory. For each of the two participants in the game -state institutions and enterprises - proposed indicators determine the strategy of the game participant and theirbehavior in such a game. The content of each of the proposed indicators is considered and it is shown how theirvalue can be obtained. The proposed indicators for both participants in the game are leveled to a single scale.The indicators of the model of the antagonistic game between the enterprise and state institutions aredetermined that became the basis for the construction of the game model, which is a tuple. The developedmodel of the influence of state institutions on the enterprise economic security system, represented by acombination of possible strategies for the behavior of both participants in the game in hyper cubic fivedimensional space, which are expressed by the values of indicators for each of these participants, as well as thecalculated “gain” for each of these combinations. Using this model allows to achieve different resultsdepending on the goal of the study. The main result of the model is the search for a balance of interests in the“enterprise-state” system. That is, the search for those points of stable choice that can be obtained using thedeveloped model, namely: search for a local or general extremum in the game field, which will determine themaximum win for one of the participants or the total win of two participants at the same time; research andquantitative estimation of the actual and maximum possible negative impact of state institutions on theeconomic security system of business entities; determining the expected change in the influence of stateinstitutions on the economic security system of business entities due to changes in its strategy; theestablishment of the best strategy for a business entity in existing conditions, which, according to the selectedcriterion, will ensure the stable functioning of the economic security system at an enterprise; determination ofthe limits of the negative impact of state institutions on the economic security system of an enterprise.

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Section: Review Of Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Interaction of State Institutions and Enterprises with Economic Security Positions in Digital Economy

Rudnichenko

Melnyk

Havlovska

et al. 2021

Wseas Transactions on Business and Economics

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“…In the past decades, the design of supply chain contracts has brought a broad appreciation for the inventory model in the context of demand information updating [33]. To encourage both the supplier and the retailer to act in the manner that reaches system-optimal level, many classic supply chain contracts (e.g., wholesaleprice, return, revenue-sharing, commitment and quantity flexibility, etc.)…”

Section: Supply Chain Contract Coordination With Demand Information Updatingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordinating a fresh-product supply chain with demand information updating: Hema Fresh O2O platform

Yang

Peng

2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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Motivated by Hema Fresh's new-retail case, we study the coordination of a two-echelon fresh-product supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer. Due to a long production lead time, the supplier has to make production decision in advance based on early demand information. The market demand can be updated during the supplier's production lead time. Hence, the retailer would make order decision according to the latest demand information. Incorporating risk-sharing mechanism of overproduction and overstock, we propose a novel bi-directional risk-sharing contract to coordinate such a supply chain with demand information updating. We construct a two-stage optimization model in which the supplier first decides production quantity, and then the retailer decides final order quantity not exceeding the supplier’s initial production. In both the centralized and decentralized systems, we analytically derive the unique equilibrium of production and order decisions in a Stackelberg supplier-led game. We prove that the proposed contract can realize supply chain perfect coordination and explore how the proposed contract affects the members'decisions. The theoretical results show that, by turning the risk-sharing proportions, the supply chain profit can be arbitrarily split between the members, which is a desired property for supply chain coordination. Compared with the single risk-sharing contract, the proposed contract results in a greater supply chain profit and achieves Pareto improvement for both members. Furthermore, we also explore how the risk preference and negotiating power affect the contract selection and the additional profit allocation of the supply chain. Numerical examples are presented to verify our theoretical results.

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“…Our study differs by highlighting the price competition between two risk‐averse retailers who sell two substitutable products separately in the end market. Other works which employ the MV approach in exploring supply chain risks include, among many others, mass customization (Choi et al, 2019; Guo & Liu, 2020), supply chain finance (Li et al, 2018; Shen et al, 2020), supplier encroachment (Chen et al, 2020; Li & Jiang, 2019), and asymmetric risk preference (Arcelus et al, 2007; Deng et al, 2013; Shen et al, 2019).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint pricing and replenishment policies for risk‐averse retailers under duopolistic competition

Zhang

Yue

2021

Manage Decis Econ

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This study investigates the coordination of pricing and inventory replenishment under retail competition. Although conventional wisdom suggests that a retailer follow conservative operating strategies when the competing retailer adopts a markdown strategy, the retailer may actually raise its price (order) if its operational costs are sufficiently high (low) and its competitor's price is relatively low. If the retailer is more risk averse, its pricing and replenishment decisions hinge highly on its risk aversion level and its competitor's current price. The increase of the wholesale price always hurts the retailers and may even hurt the manufacturer if it is exorbitant.

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A Review on Supply Chain Contracting with Information Considerations: Information Updating and Information Asymmetry

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Strategic Interaction of State Institutions and Enterprises with Economic Security Positions in Digital Economy

Strategic Interaction of State Institutions and Enterprises with Economic Security Positions in Digital Economy

Coordinating a fresh-product supply chain with demand information updating: Hema Fresh O2O platform

Joint pricing and replenishment policies for risk‐averse retailers under duopolistic competition

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