A Reply to Critics

Liars, truthtellers, and naysayers: A broader view of semantic pathology I

“…Various problems confront attempted consistent solutions to the inconsistent semantic pathology exhibited by the liar paradox and its ilk-from the revenge-susceptibility of these proffered solutions, to the self-thwarting restrictions they place on expressibility, to their flagrant ad hockery (e.g., unmotivated declarations of the meaninglessness of otherwise semantically pathological sentences (Cf. Sorensen, 2005;Goldstein, 2001 and2002)). On the other hand, as we have shown elsewhere, 55 there is no viable means by which dialetheism can resolve the indeterminate semantic pathology that the asymmetric variants of the open pair present.…”

The Problem with Truthmaker-Gap Epistemicism

“…For a large class of propositions, we can use (1) and (2) as definitions of ‘∇’ and ‘ Δ ’. But Sorensen holds that (at least some) a priori truths are ungrounded (Sorensen , p. 716), for they need no truthmaker to be true. And yet, since they are knowable, they must (by epistemicist lights) be determinate.…”

Truthmaker Gaps and the No‐No Paradox

“…Sorensen (2001, 2005a, 2005b) has argued that: (1) The no‐no paradox is not a version of the liar but rather a cousin of the truth‐teller paradox. (2) Even so, the no‐no paradox is more paradoxical than the truth‐teller.…”

“…The second problem only emerges if the first problem proves to be intractable. As it turns out, Sorensen (2005b) thinks that AGW “only cleanly exclude the F‐F assignment”. Is he right?…”