A reconfigurable smart interface based on IEEE 1451 and field programmable gate array for multiple Internet of Things devices

Wang, Shulong; Hou, Yu; Gao, Fang; Ji, Xinrong

doi:10.1177/1550147717693848

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 16 publications

(15 reference statements)

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“…The feasibility of such a Smart meter setup has been studied and validated in the existing literature [8]. We also gently point to the recent studies on FPGA-enabled IoT devices [9], that support our assumption. A salient feature of the protocol is its operational asymmetry, such that the computation at the Smart meter is less resource-intensive than the computation at the servers.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 61%

Safe is the New Smart: PUF-Based Authentication for Load Modification-Resistant Smart Meters

Boyapally

Mathew

Patranabis

et al. 2022

IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Comput.

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In the energy sector, IoT manifests in the form of next-generation power grids that provide enhanced electrical stability, efficient power distribution, and utilization. The primary feature of a Smart Grid is the presence of an advanced bi-directional communication network between the Smart meters at the consumer end and the servers at the Utility Operators. Smart meters are broadly vulnerable to attacks on communication and physical systems. We propose a secure and operationally asymmetric mutual authentication and key-exchange protocol for secure communication. Our protocol balances security and efficiency, delegates complex cryptographic operations to the resource-equipped servers, and carefully manages the workload on the resource-constrained Smart meter nodes using unconventional lightweight primitives such as Physically Unclonable Functions. We prove the security of the protocol using well-established cryptographic assumptions. We implement the proposed scheme end-to-end in a Smart meter prototype using commercial-off-the-shelf products, a Utility server, and a credential generator as the trusted third party. Additionally, we demonstrate a physics-based attack named load modification attack on the Smart meter to demonstrate that merely securing the communication channel using authentication does not secure the meter, but requires further protections to ensure the correctness of the reported consumption. Hence, we propose a countermeasure to such an attack that goes side-by-side with our protocol implementation.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 61%