A Preliminary Comparative Study of Policy Making in Two GCC Countries—Qatar and Kuwait: Processes, Politics, and Participants

Abstract

Drawing from extensive fieldwork and a rich literature on policy dynamics, I offer a preliminary comparative analysis of the policy process in Qatar and Kuwait focusing mainly on the participants. I assess the broad outlines of politics and power in decision‐making processes in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) while suggesting means of making them more efficient, representative, and responsive to the needs of citizens. This is the first academic article investigating similarities and differences through a systematic analysis of the policy participants in these two countries and their role in the policy‐making process; few studies analyze comparatively the dynamics of policy making in the GCC. Considering the emerging need for governments to develop and implement better processes and increase public participation in government decisions as the result of the Arab revolutions, this article provides recommendations for Qatar and Kuwait, with potential application in the region.

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