A Perceptual Theory of Hope

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of what the attitude of hope consists in. We argue that shortcomings in recent theories of hope have methodological roots in that they proceed with little regard for the rich body of literature on the emotions. Taking insights from work in the philosophy of emotions, we argue that hope involves a kind of normative perception. We then develop a strategy for determining the content of this perception, arguing that hope is a perception of practical reasons. Our proposal stands in contrast with familiar views on which hope is fundamentally about the good. We conclude by considering the increasingly popular idea that some hopes are non-intentional and thus, by implication, non-perceptual. We reply by arguing that our perceptual theory plausibly generalizes to these instances of hope.

Hope in political philosophy

“…For example, it has been argued that the pair of desire and belief fails to distinguish hope from despair (Meirav, 2009). A variety of suggestions have been put forward how to revise or complement it (since the overview in Blöser & Stahl, 2017, several new contributions have appeared, for example, Han‐Pile, 2017; Kwong, 2019; Milona, 2018; Milona & Stockdale, 2018). More fundamentally yet, others dispute that hope is even accurately described as a ‘compound’ state constituted by a desire, belief and possibly a third component, proposing instead to analyse it as a simple state (Segal & Textor, 2015) or concept (Blöser, 2019).…”

Social and Political Dimensions of Hope

“…Martin argues that hoping involves, beyond belief and desire, incorporating hope's other features-for example, thoughts, feelings, activities, and modes of perception-into one's "rational scheme of ends" (Martin 2014, 8). My own view is that hope involves a perceptual-like experience of the possibility that the desired outcome will obtain as encouraging, to varying degrees, and hopeful feelings (Milona and Stockdale 2018). 4 As Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) and many scholars from within, and inspired by, the Black feminist tradition have shown, socially and politically relevant features of the self cannot be considered in isolation; the ways in which Black women experience gender oppression, for example, cannot be understood without reference to Black women's experiences as Black women .…”

“…Martin argues that hoping involves, beyond belief and desire, incorporating hope’s other features—for example, thoughts, feelings, activities, and modes of perception—into one’s “rational scheme of ends” (Martin , 8). My own view is that hope involves a perceptual‐like experience of the possibility that the desired outcome will obtain as encouraging, to varying degrees, and hopeful feelings (Milona and Stockdale ).…”

Hope and Hopefulness

“…As a remedy, these discussions either attempt to improve the standard account of hope or to recommend an altogether different approach. Some theorists supplement the standard account with further conditions (e.g., Bovens 1999; Kwong 2018;Martin 2014;Meirav 2009;Milona and Stockdale 2018;Pettit 2004), while others argue that the concept of hope cannot be analyzed in terms of belief and desire (Blöser 2019;Segal and Textor 2015). 1 The literature on hope in philosophy is therefore well stocked with theories of hope, with little or no consensus.…”

“…It seems highly implausible that in order for me to hope for this outcome, I am required to believe that some external factor is working in my favor or that I see a way forward to this outcome(Meirav 2009;Kwong 2018). As I will argue later, these conditions are better thought of as pertaining to hopefulness or what it is to have hope.7 Contrast this withMilona and Stockdale (2018) andMilona (2018). For instance, Milona claims that "one cannot hope for something and despair over it at the same time" (3).836 Jack M. C.Kwong…”