2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.trc.2019.05.016
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A Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral scheme to manage mass transit congestion with heterogeneous commuters

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Cited by 37 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…On the theoretical front, promising new findings by Tang et al. ( 2020a , b ) indicate that the integration of fare-reward schemes with non-rewarding uniform fares may achieve demand management goals revenue neutrally.…”
Section: Practical Demand Management Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…On the theoretical front, promising new findings by Tang et al. ( 2020a , b ) indicate that the integration of fare-reward schemes with non-rewarding uniform fares may achieve demand management goals revenue neutrally.…”
Section: Practical Demand Management Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This version of the tradeable credit scheme is in fact equivalent to a revenue neutral monetary surcharge-reward scheme proposed by Kalmanje and Kockelman ( 2004 ) for road pricing, and more recently adapted to public transport by Tang et al. ( 2020b ). Moreover, Bao et al.…”
Section: Practical Demand Management Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other hand, some studies in recent years have also found that, in addition to reasonable bus line design, the differentiated fares can also improve the efficiency of the traffic system; compared with the traditional fare scheme, differentiated bus fares strategy often has more advantages [9,10]. The differentiated fares system can effectively reduce travelers' time cost and alleviate traffic congestion during peak hours [11,12]. The implementation of differentiated fares based on comfort level can reduce social costs and is more conducive to the public transport system than charging congestion fees [13].…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To implement B.1 and B.2, the same amount of demand-side information would be required when setting the credit price of capacity segments as what differentiated pricing requires (see Section 4.2), to ensure that demand never exceeds the critical occupancy rate. This version of the tradeable credit scheme is in fact equivalent to a revenue neutral monetary surcharge-reward scheme proposed by Kalmanje and Kockelman (2004) for road pricing, and more recently adapted to public transport by Tang et al (2020b). Moreover, Bao et al (2019) show that option B.1 might lead to an unstable equilibrium in the standard bottleneck model, and therefore the welfare gain it provides is also uncertain.…”
Section: Practical Applicabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%