A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games

Abstract

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Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

“…14 There is a strand of the literature that studies equilibria with history-dependent strategies. See Cho & Duggan (2009), Cho & Duggan (2015), Herings et al (2017), Herings et al (2018).…”

G-games with coalitions

“…Inequalities (30) and (31) give an upper bound for the distance in total variation between the law of X( t) and the distribution µ. Now, by following the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain equation (28).…”

“…In [28] a one-period game with unitary memory is studied (K = 1) and a Folk Theorem for bargaining games is presented.…”

Costless delay in negotiations

“…As argued in Maskin and Tirole (2001), stationary strategies prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is consistent with rationality. Moreover, without the assumption of stationarity, it follows from the results of Herrero (1985), Haller (1986), Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Herings et al (2017) that multilateral bargaining models lack prediction power.…”