A New Look at Split-Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model

Abstract

We argue that conservative districts that go Democratic for the House should be likely to choose a Republican for president, while liberal districts represented by a Republican should be likely to opt for a Democrat for president. We test these and related predictions about split-ticket voting with election data from the eight presidential elections between 1964 and 1992. We show that ideological differences in the estimated location of the district's median voter explains a substantial component of the systematic variation in patterns of split outcomes in this period across districts, but that other factors (e.g., an especially popular incumbent or a particularly poor challenger, the magnitude of presidential election victory, region-specific realignment effects) also play a role.Why do voters split their tickets between a president of one party and a representative or senator of another party? Why do some districts register a majority of votes for one party's presidential candidate but simultaneously give their support to another party's candidate for House or Senate? Why has the degree of ticket-splitting and the number of constituencies with split outcomes generally been on the rise from the minuscule proportions they were in elections earlier in this century?The best-known line of argument seeking to answer these questions can be labeled the "candidate-centered politics" thesis. According to this thesis, declining voter party loyalties, the rise in the number of voters who call themselves independents, media-centered campaigns, the decline of party machines, and an

Split-Ticket Voting: The Effects of Cognitive Madisonianism

“…The literature can be organized into studies of aggregate versus individual data, separable versus nonseparable preferences, and policy balancing versus actual ticket splitting. The first set of investigations emphasize evidence from political geographic units-the nation or legislative districts (Burden and Kimball 1998;Fiorina 1992;Grofman et al 2000;Jacobson 1990). These aggregate studies, while insightful, are indirect, not looking at the individual voters themselves.…”

toward a science of politics?

“…42 This quote is taken from the programme description of Duke University's Summer Institute on the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models, 14 June -9 July 2004 (www.poli.duke.edu/eitm/), the third in the series of summer workshops funded by the US National Science Foundation. 43 www.isr.umich.edu/cps/eitm/eitm2006/causality2006.html 44 Indeed, virtually all of the EITM themes are anticipated in my own previous work (see, e.g., Grofman, 1974Grofman, , 1982Pool and Grofman, 1975;Brunell and Grofman, 1998;Grofman et al, 1998Grofman et al, , 2000Adams et al, 2005;Regenwetter et al, 2006). Thus, like the Molière character who finds that he has been speaking prose all his life without knowing that this is what he has been doing, I find myself having been practicing EITM all my life without having known that as a name to call what I have been doing.…”

Who Wants Checks and Balances? Endogeneity of the Balancing Perspective

“…Thus, some scholars also label the intentional model of sp lit-ticket Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research -ISSN 2288-6168 (Online) Vol. 2 No.3 May 2015: 196-227 http://dx.doi.org/10.15206/ajpor.2015 198 voting as the "cognitive-Madisonianism" model (Ladd, 1990;Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2004).In contrast, the unintentional model argues that voters split their votes mainly for other reasons (incumbency advantage, issue-ownership) rather than an intention for a divided government (Alvarez & Schousen, 1993;Born, 1994;Burden & Kimball, 1998;Garand & Lichtl 2000;Grofman, Koetzle, McDonald, & Brunell, 2000; Geer, Carter, McHenry, Teten, & Jennifer Hoef, 2004;Petrocik, 1991; Sigelman, Wahlbeck, & Buel l, 1997). Thus, the unintentional model does not predict a divided government but argues that such phenomenon could be simply an accident.…”

“…In contrast, the unintentional model argues that voters split their votes mainly for other reasons (incumbency advantage, issue-ownership) rather than an intention for a divided government (Alvarez & Schousen, 1993;Born, 1994;Burden & Kimball, 1998;Garand & Lichtl 2000;Grofman, Koetzle, McDonald, & Brunell, 2000; Geer, Carter, McHenry, Teten, & Jennifer Hoef, 2004;Petrocik, 1991; Sigelman, Wahlbeck, & Buel l, 1997). Thus, the unintentional model does not predict a divided government but argues that such phenomenon could be simply an accident.…”