A new implementation of narrowband interference detection, characterization, and mitigation technique for a software-defined multi-GNSS receiver

Abstract

Due to the very low power of satellite signals when reaching the earth's surface, global navigation satellite system receivers are vulnerable to various types of radio frequency interference, and, therefore, countermeasures are necessary. In the case of a narrowband interference (NBI), the adaptive notch filtering technique has been extensively investigated. However, the research on the topic has focused on the adaptation of the notch frequency, but not of the notch width. We present a fully adaptive solution to counter NBI. The technique is capable of detecting and characterizing any number of narrow interfered bands, and then optimizing the mitigation process based on such characterization, namely the estimates of both interference frequency and width. Its full adaptiveness makes it suitable to cope with the unpredictable and diverse nature of unintentional interfering events. In addition to a thorough performance evaluation of the proposed method, which shows its benefits in terms of signal quality improvement, an analysis of the impact of different NBI profiles on GPS L1 C/A and Galileo E1 is also conducted.

A resilient architecture for the realization and distribution of coordinated universal time to critical infrastructure systems in the United States :

“…The use of multi-constellation GNSS receivers provides more protection against RF interference than single-constellation receivers, such as a GPS only device. The more costly multi-constellation, multifrequency receivers, capable of receiving all of the signals listed in Table II.C.2, actually provide a high level of protection against RF interference, as the frequency diversity of the various GNSS signals makes it unlikely that a single interference or jamming source could block all satellite reception [61].…”

A Double Threshold Cooperative GNSS Interference Detection Algorithm Based on Fuzzy Logic

“…However, the GNSS navigation signal adopts a direct sequence spread spectrum, and its downlink signal reaches the receiver with a weak signal, about -130dbm [3], making the GNSS receiver vulnerable to intentional or unintentional radio frequency interference (RFI) in the electromagnetic environment. Unintentional sources of RFI mainly include harmonic emissions [4] of some electrical equipment in life, such as commercial high-power transmitter, television, and personal electronic equipment, etc. The jammer produces malicious jamming, and the jamming method is to disrupt the receiver operation by deliberately broadcasting strong signals in the GNSS frequency band.…”

Impact Analysis of Standardized GNSS Receiver Testing against Real-World Interferences Detected at Live Monitoring Sites

“…This paper focusses on the threat posed by Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) to the GNSS L1/E1 spectrum. RFI can be emitted either unintentionally, e.g., by commercial high-power transmitters, ultra-wideband radar, television, VHF, mobile satellite services, and personal electronic devices, or intentionally, e.g., by jammers and more sophisticated signal spoofing devices [2,3].…”

“…Collectively, the above activities aim to improve mitigation and resilience of future GNSS receivers against real-world interference threats. An example of such an attempt has already been made in [3], where an adaptive interference mitigation technique was proposed to counteract unintentional Narrow-Band Interference (NBI) detected at one of the STRIKE3 monitoring sites.…”