A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center

González‐Díaz, Julio; Sánchez-Rodríguez, E.

doi:10.1007/s00182-007-0074-5

Cited by 43 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…(ii) Let the rule in BBM,T, assign for every (c, w) ∈ BBM the core-center (see González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2007)) of (N, ω c,w ). From Núñez and Rafels (2005) and Tejada and Núñez (2012), we know that this allocation differs from the nucleolus (of the assignment game) for the whole class of market games in BBG, but that they coincide for bilateral markets.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets

Tejada

Álvarez-Mozos

2016

Rev Econ Design

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider a market comprising a number of perfectly complementary and homogeneous commodities. We concentrate on the incentives for firms producing these commodities to merge and form a vertical syndicate. The main result establishes that the nucleolus of the associated market game corresponds to the unique vector of prices with the following properties: (i) they are vertical syndication-proof, (ii) they are competitive, (iii) they yield the average of the buyersand the sellers-optimal allocations in bilateral markets, and (iv) they depend on the traders' bargaining power but not on their identity. The proof uses an isomorphism between our class of market games and the entire class of bankruptcy games.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets

Tejada

Álvarez-Mozos

2016

Rev Econ Design

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We present now the core-center, introduced in González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2007). Let U (A) denote the uniform distribution defined over the set A and E(P) the expectation of the probability distribution P.…”

Section: The Core and Its Relativesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards an axiomatization of the core-center

González‐Díaz

Sánchez-Rodríguez

2009

European Journal of Operational Research

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There are, however, remarkable exceptions. See, for example, González‐Díaz and Sánchez‐Rodríguez () and Tijs et al . ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition Formation and Bargaining Protocols: A Review of the Literature

Rogna

2018

Journal of Economic Surveys

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper offers a review of the vast literature regarding bargaining and coalition formation. This topic has been generally described as the attempt to provide strategic foundations to cooperative solution concepts. It can therefore be seen as the linking ring between the non‐cooperative and the cooperative game‐theoretic approach to coalition formation. Its central role in economic theory and its relatively long history that goes back to the Nash program have fostered a large academic production, including surveys. Nonetheless, this paper will focus on an aspect that is often neglected in the dedicated surveys: the specificities of the bargaining protocols leading to different outcomes. Although generally downgraded to the rank of details, the differences in bargaining protocols, even when minor, can cause significant changes in fundamental aspects such as the possibility to reach full cooperation, the distribution of final pay‐offs and the time taken to reach an agreement. Focused on externalities‐free games, therefore on bargaining protocols sustaining solution concepts for cooperative games in characteristic function form, the paper aims at providing a brief but exhaustive review of the topic that could result in a very useful tool for any researcher approaching the subject of coalitional bargaining.

show abstract

A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center

Abstract: We present a new allocation rule for the class of games with a nonempty core: the core-center. This allocation rule selects a centrally located point within the core of any such game. We provide a deep discussion of its main properties.

Cited by 43 publications

References 9 publications

Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets

Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets

Towards an axiomatization of the core-center

Coalition Formation and Bargaining Protocols: A Review of the Literature

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About