Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets

Tejada, Oriol; Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel

doi:10.1007/s10058-016-0193-1

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…We show that the set of payoff vectors related to competitive equilibria coincide with the core. This generalizes the result in Gale (1960) for two-sided assignment markets and Tejada (2010) for the classical multi-sided assignment markets where buyers are forced to acquire exactly one item of each type.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 82%

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices

Atay

Llerena

Núñez

2016

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A generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 82%

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices

Atay

Llerena

Núñez

2016

TOP

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“…Gale (1960) defines competitive equilibrium prices and proves their existence for any assignment problem (see also Shapley and Shubik, 1971). Tejada (2010) extends the coincidence between core and competitive equilibria for the classical three-sided assignment markets where buyers are forced to acquire exactly one item of each type. In a similar fashion, Atay et al (2016) generalizes the equivalence result for the generalized three-sided assignment markets where buyers can buy at most one good of each type.…”

Section: Core and Competitive Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 90%

Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility

Atay¹,

Bahel²,

Solymosi³

2021

Preprint

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This paper studies matching markets in the presence of middlemen. In our framework, a buyer-seller pair may either trade directly or use the services of a middleman; and a middleman may serve multiple buyer-seller pairs. Direct trade between a buyer and a seller is costlier than a trade mediated by a middleman. For each such market, we examine an associated cooperative game with transferable utility. First, we show that an optimal matching for a matching market with middlemen can be obtained by considering the two-sided assignment market where each buyer-seller pair is allowed to use the mediation service of the middlemen free of charge and attain the maximum surplus. Second, we prove that the core of a matching market with middlemen is always non-empty. Third, we show the existence of a buyer-optimal core allocation and a seller-optimal core allocation. In general, the core does not exhibit a middleman-optimal matching. Finally, we establish the coincidence between the core and the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.

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“…A pairing situation is a triple (N 1 , N 2 , A), where N 1 and N 2 are two finite non-empty player sets -possibly of different cardinalities -and A is a mapping that assigns a non-negative number to 1 To our knowledge, the merging of players from different sides of an assignment situation has only been analyzed in Tejada and Álvarez-Mozos (2012), where a connection between multi-sided assignment games and bankruptcy games is used to find the unique allocation which, among other properties, is immune to a certain type of vertical merging. every pair composed exactly of one player of N 1 and one player of N 2 .…”

Section: A Unifying Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%