A model of response time effects in symbolic comparison.

Leth‐Steensen, Craig; Marley, A. A. J.

doi:10.1037/0033-295x.107.1.162

Cited by 77 publications

(130 citation statements)

References 96 publications

(344 reference statements)

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“…Both models correctly imply changes of rank order between buying and selling prices. As noted by Leth-Steensen and Marley (2000) in reference to Birnbaum and Jou (1990), it can be difficult to distinguish effects of bias parameter from those attributed to the evaluation process. A critical test between these interpretations has not yet been conducted.…”

Section: Choice Response Times and Configural Weightingmentioning

confidence: 99%

New paradoxes of risky decision making.

Birnbaum¹

2008

Psychological Review

343

387

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During the last 25 years, prospect theory and its successor, cumulative prospect theory, replaced expected utility as the dominant descriptive theories of risky decision making. Although these models account for the original Allais paradoxes, 11 new paradoxes show where prospect theories lead to self-contradiction or systematic false predictions. The new findings are consistent with and, in several cases, were predicted in advance by simple "configural weight" models in which probability-consequence branches are weighted by a function that depends on branch probability and ranks of consequences on discrete branches. Although they have some similarities to later models called "rank-dependent utility," configural weight models do not satisfy coalescing, the assumption that branches leading to the same consequence can be combined by adding their probabilities. Nor do they satisfy cancellation, the "independence" assumption that branches common to both alternatives can be removed. The transfer of attention exchange model, with parameters estimated from previous data, correctly predicts results with all 11 new paradoxes. Apparently, people do not frame choices as prospects but, instead, as trees with branches.

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Section: Choice Response Times and Configural Weightingmentioning

confidence: 99%

New paradoxes of risky decision making.

Birnbaum¹

2008

Psychological Review

343

387

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“…If, as many researchers assume, people's reasoning about abstract relationships maps these on to physical relationships (e.g., Barsalou, 1999Barsalou, , 2008 Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, KrauthGruber, & Ric, 2005) then the coherence of information sets may have other effects. Mental representations of distinct concepts, ideas, or cognitive elements in general may be supported by 'mental space', as space may be used metaphorically to represent relations or processing steps within reasoning (Kant, 1999;Holyoak & Patterson, 1981;Leth-Steensen & Marley, 2000). If so, then elements that are coherent with each other within a context, a set of propositions, or a structure in general, should be seen as 'closer' to one another in space, relative to elements that are less coherent, as is manifest in the intuitive description of coherence in terms of the spatial metaphor of 'fit'.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spatial representation of coherence.

Hecker¹,

Hahn

Rollings³

2016

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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Four experiments examined spatial correlates of the experience of coherence, that is, the extent to which propositions 'fit together'. Experiment 1 demonstrates for Heiderian triads (i.e., sets of liking/disliking relations between three fictitious persons) that name pairs from balanced triads, such as two friends commonly disliking a third person (high coherence) are seen as closer to each other in physical space as compared to name pairs from unbalanced triads, such as two persons disliking each other and having a common friend (low coherence). This pattern of results is conceptually replicated in two further experiments for categorical syllogisms. Two terms in conclusions from valid syllogisms (high coherence) were seen as spatially closer to each other than when two terms came from invalid syllogisms (low coherence). In the final two experiments, similar closeness effects are demonstrated for word pairs from scenarios that "made sense" in terms of causal connectedness (latent causality) as opposed to word pairs from scenarios perceived as causally unconnected. These findings are discussed in the context of spatial binding theories, applied psychology, and embodied cognition in general, and their methodological implications are highlighted.Word count: 184 1 In this research we seek to present evidence for spatial processing as a correlate, or mediating mechanism, of the experience of coherence. 'Coherence', or the extent to which claims or pieces of evidence 'fit' together, is a notion that is central to people's evaluation of information. It has consequently attracted interest from philosophers (e.g., Olsson, 2005;Bovens & Hartmann, 2003), cognitive scientists interested in theory formation and explanation (e.g., Thagard, 2000), and psychologists interested in the evaluation of evidence, testimony, and witness credibility (e.g., Berman & Cutler, 1996;Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995;Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, & Luszcz , 1999;Harris & Hahn, 2009). The concept has also been used to shape or reformulate theories on action planning and goal-related reasoning (Thagard & Millgram, 1995), as well as impression formation, where judgments about other people have to be generated based on piecemeal information on traits and behaviours (Kunda & Thagard, 1996). Also, text and discourse comprehension has been described as a coherence problem, involving the simultaneous assignment of meanings to different words and expressions (Kintsch, 1988; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994).At the most general level, coherence is seen as the degree to which a number of ideas make sense as an entire set. This criterion can be applied to propositions within theoretical systems, whereby coherence appears as a criterion for the truth of the whole system (e.g., Quine & Ullian, 1978). Closer to psychology, Thagard (2000) defined coherence in terms of parallel constraint satisfaction problems, whereby in a process of "mental balancing" (p. 3) complementary and conflicting pieces of information are integrated until they all f...

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“…In what grew into an extensive research program on symbolic comparison (for overviews, see Banks, 1977;Leth-Steensen & Marley, 2000;Moyer & Dumais, 1978;Potts et al, 1978), numerous studies showed that pairedcomparison tasks that required participants to retrieve magnitude information from memory yielded RT and error patterns similar to the ones observed in studies on perceptual comparison. Therefore, distance effects in memory-based comparative judgments are often referred to as symbolic distance effects (SDEs; Moyer & Bayer, 1976).…”

Section: Comparative Magnitude Judgments and The Distance Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The symbolic comparison literature converges on the notion that an iterative two-stage comparison process underlies memorybased comparative magnitude judgments (Leth-Steensen & Marley, 2000). However, the specific implementation of this comparison process varies somewhat between models because of differing assumptions about stimulus representation (analog versus propositional debate; cf.…”

Section: The Mac Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Magnitude comparison extended: How lack of knowledge informs comparative judgments under uncertainty.

Schweickart¹,

Brown²

2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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How do people compare quantitative attributes of real-world objects? (e.g., Which country has the higher per capita GDP, Mauritania or Nepal?). The research literature on this question is divided: Although researchers in the 1970s and 1980s assumed that a 2-stage magnitude comparison process underlies these types of judgments (Banks, 1977), more recent approaches emphasize the role of probabilistic cues and simple heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research Group, 1999). In this article, we review the magnitude comparison literature and propose a framework for magnitude comparison under uncertainty (MaC). Predictions from this framework were tested in a choice context involving one recognized and one unrecognized object, and were contrasted with those based on the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). This was done in 2 paired-comparison studies. In both, participants were timed as they decided which of 2 countries had the higher per capita gross domestic product (GDP). Consistent with the MaC account, we found that response times (RTs) displayed a classic symbolic distance effect: RTs were inversely related to the difference between the subjective per capita GDPs of the compared countries. Furthermore, choice of the recognized country became more frequent as subjective difference increased. These results indicate that the magnitude comparison process extends to choice contexts that have previously been associated only with cue-based strategies. We end by discussing how several findings reported in the recent heuristics literature relate to the MaC framework.

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A model of response time effects in symbolic comparison.

Cited by 77 publications

References 96 publications

New paradoxes of risky decision making.

New paradoxes of risky decision making.

Spatial representation of coherence.

Magnitude comparison extended: How lack of knowledge informs comparative judgments under uncertainty.

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