Magnitude comparison extended: How lack of knowledge informs comparative judgments under uncertainty.

Schweickart, Oliver; Brown, Norman

doi:10.1037/a0031451

Cited by 11 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 121 publications

(243 reference statements)

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“…001, when fixing r(rep1) = .592), suggesting that RH use may have decreased across the duration of the experiment. This is not unreasonable, as repetition may have increased the familiarity of previously unknown stimuli within the experiment (see Schweickart & Brown, 2014), forcing participants to rely on more knowledge-based strategies later in the experiment. The resulting s -parameters of .198 for first repetition trials and .202 for fourth repetition trials did not differ (Δ G 2 = .03, p =.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Familiarity and recollection in heuristic decision making.

Schwikert¹,

Curran²

2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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Heuristics involve the ability to utilize memory to make quick judgments by exploiting fundamental cognitive abilities. In the current study we investigated the memory processes that contribute to the recognition heuristic and the fluency heuristic, which are both presumed to capitalize on the by-products of memory to make quick decisions. In Experiment 1, we used a city-size comparison task while recording event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the potential contributions of familiarity and recollection to the two heuristics. ERPs were markedly different for recognition heuristic-based decisions and fluency heuristic-based decisions, suggesting a role for familiarity in the recognition heuristic and recollection in the fluency heuristic. In Experiment 2, we coupled the same city-size comparison task with measures of subjective pre-experimental memory for each stimulus in the task. Although previous literature suggests the fluency heuristic relies on recognition speed alone, our results suggest differential contributions of recognition speed and recollected knowledge to these decisions, whereas the recognition heuristic relies on familiarity. Based on these results, we created a new theoretical frame work that explains decisions attributed to both heuristics based on the underlying memory associated with the choice options.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Familiarity and recollection in heuristic decision making.

Schwikert¹,

Curran²

2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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“…That such linear orders are indeed powerful structures in inferential decision making was shown by Tan (2011), Pohl andHilbig (2012), and Schweickart and Brown (2014). Subjective retrieval fluency might be helpful to construct such an order in the first place, but not to infer the answers in single pairs, at least not after such an order has been established-which, in turn, is arguably fostered by repeating the objects.…”

Section: Problem 2: Repeated Presentationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The limited use of the fluency heuristic: Converging evidence across different procedures

et al. 2016

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In paired comparisons based on which of two objects has the larger criterion value, decision makers could use the subjectively experienced difference in retrieval fluency of the objects as a cue. According to the fluency heuristic (FH) theory, decision makers use fluency-as indexed by recognition speed-as the only cue for pairs of recognized objects, and infer that the object retrieved more speedily has the larger criterion value (ignoring all other cues and information). Model-based analyses, however, have previously revealed that only a small portion of such inferences are indeed based on fluency alone. In the majority of cases, other information enters the decision process. However, due to the specific experimental procedures, the estimates of FH use are potentially biased: Some procedures may have led to an overestimated and others to an underestimated, or even to actually reduced, FH use. In the present article, we discuss and test the impacts of such procedural variations by reanalyzing 21 data sets. The results show noteworthy consistency across the procedural variations revealing low FH use. We discuss potential explanations and implications of this finding.

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“…We focused on the difference between heuristic and knowledge users. We found the order effect (i.e., response time tended to become shorter as the questions proceeded; e.g., Honda et al, 2017;Schweickart & Brown, 2014) in difficult questions, but there were not significant differences between heuristic and knowledge users. For the detailed results of the analyses of response time, see Supplementary material 4.…”

Section: Main Results Regarding Strategy Classificationmentioning

confidence: 69%

Familiarity‐Matching: An Ecologically Rational Heuristic for the Relationships‐Comparison Task

et al. 2020

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Previous studies have shown that people often use heuristics in making inferences and that subjective memory experiences, such as recognition or familiarity of objects, can be valid cues for inferences. So far, many researchers have used the binary choice task in which two objects are presented as alternatives (e.g., “Which city has the larger population, city A or city B?”). However, objects can be presented not only as alternatives but also in a question (e.g., “Which country is city X in, country A or country B?”). In such a situation, people can make inferences based on the relationship between the object in the question and each object given as an alternative. In the present study, we call this type of task a “relationships‐comparison task.” We modeled the three inference strategies that people could apply to solve it (familiarity‐matching [FM; a new heuristic we propose in this study], familiarity heuristic [FH], and knowledge‐based inference [KI]) to examine people's inference processes. Through Studies 1, 2, and 3, we found that (a) people tended to rely on heuristics, and that FM (inferences based on similarity in familiarity between objects) well explained participants' inference patterns; (b) FM could work as an ecologically rational strategy for the relationships–comparison task since it could effectively reflect environmental structures, and that the use of FM could be highly replicable and robust; and (c) people could sometimes use a decision strategy like FM, even in their daily lives (consumer behaviors). The nature of the relationships–comparison task and human cognitive processes is discussed.

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Magnitude comparison extended: How lack of knowledge informs comparative judgments under uncertainty.

Cited by 11 publications

References 121 publications

Familiarity and recollection in heuristic decision making.

Familiarity and recollection in heuristic decision making.

The limited use of the fluency heuristic: Converging evidence across different procedures

Familiarity‐Matching: An Ecologically Rational Heuristic for the Relationships‐Comparison Task

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