A Misunderstanding of Peirce's Phenomenology

Ransdell, Joseph

doi:10.2307/2106579

Cited by 5 publications

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“…So, Firstness applied to experience is the sense of feeling, a single mode of consciousness, “perfectly simple and without parts” (CP 1.531). The reason this definition of Quality is easily misunderstood is the temptation to simply equate it with sense perception (Ransdell, ), much as we think of the color “red” as being certain wavelengths of light perceived by the eye. Peirce, however, understood Quality to be something independent of sense perception.…”

Section: Quality Relation and Mediationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Listening, Hearing, Sensing: Three Modes of Being and the Phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce

Bodie

Crick

2014

Commun Theor

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This article accepts Lipari's invitation to continue rethinking communication along the lines of artful listening as understood through the lens of phenomenology. However, we trace out the implications following a different phenomenological tradition than the one stemming from the German tradition of Heidegger and Husserl—specifically, the phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce, who allows us to see listening differently and perhaps more clearly. The primary contribution from Peirce's phenomenology is the logos he uses to extract 3 fundamental categories of thought and nature: Firstness (Quality), Secondness (Relation), and Thirdness (Mediation). As we shall show, listening is characterized by a plural consciousness sensitive to Mediation as it reveals itself through Relation and Quality.

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Section: Quality Relation and Mediationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Listening, Hearing, Sensing: Three Modes of Being and the Phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce

Bodie

Crick

2014

Commun Theor

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“…Although Peirce draws on a distinct phenomenology (Spiegelberg 1981 , pp. 27-50), the notion of the "phenomenal" suggests a "phenomenalism" which he as a scientifi c realist found repugnant (see Ransdell 1978). "Representations," from a semiotic point of view, are not a special class of objects such that certain (typically mental ) things inherently have to represent while others can never do so.…”

Section: What It Could Be Likementioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification

Champagne

2009

Dialogue

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This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explanatory gap" that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel's revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block's controversial claim that we should countenance a "phenomenal-consciousness" which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reifi cation of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind qualities from occurrences. RÉSUMÉ : Cet article suggère que «le fossé dans l'explication» qui tracasse la ré-fl exion sur la conscience depuis le renouveau instauré par T. Nagel est dû en grande partie à un défaut de distinctions notionnelles. En modifi ant l'affi rmation controversée de Ned Block que nous devrions accepter la présence d'une «conscience-phénoménale» ayant une existence propre, nous soutenons qu'il est possible de récupérer les intuitions qui sous-tendent cette proposition sans pour autant endosser une trop coûteuse réifi cation de la facette en question. En recouvrant la trichotomie complète en « type/token/tone » développée par C. S. Peirce, nous croyons que la spécifi cité sur laquelle Block attire (avec justesse) l'attention peut être conçue comme découlant non pas d'un quelconque module opérant furtivement dans l'esprit, mais bien de notre capacité de préscinder les qualités des occurrences. 146 Dialogue It's not hard to see how philosophers have tied themselves into such knots over qualia. They started where anyone with any sense would start: with their strongest and clearest intuitions about their own minds. Those intuitions, alas, form a mutually self-supporting closed circle of doctrines, imprisoning their imaginations in the Cartesian Theater. Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained , 1991[I]f we ask what has been the impact of semiotics upon philosophy over the course of the 20 th century, to answer anything beyond "marginal" would be an exaggeration. This situation, as I read it, is about to change dramatically. John N. Deely, "The Impact of Semiotics on Philosophy" (paper delivered at the fi rst annual homage to Oscar Parland, University of Helsinki, December 1, 2000)

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Semiotic Phenomenology and Peirce

Sullivan¹

1983

Semiotics 1981

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A Misunderstanding of Peirce's Phenomenology

Cited by 5 publications

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Listening, Hearing, Sensing: Three Modes of Being and the Phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce

Listening, Hearing, Sensing: Three Modes of Being and the Phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce

Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification

Semiotic Phenomenology and Peirce

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