A Mid‐Range Theory of Control and Coordination in Service Triads

Bastl, Marko; Johnson, M. Eric; Finne, Max

doi:10.1111/jscm.12187

Cited by 27 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 76 publications

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“…In a buyer–supplier relationship, the buyer is often thought to be the “controller” (the firm exercising control) and the supplier the “controllee” (the target of control) (Liu, ; Stouthuysen, Slabbinck, & Roodhooft, ). Firms typically use a broad portfolio of different control practices, consisting of formal and informal controls (Bastl, Johnson, & Finne, ; Choudhury & Sabherwal, ; Kirsch, Sambamurthy, Ko, & Purvis, ; Ouchi, ). Formal controls can be subdivided into outcome and behavior controls.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imitation of Management Practices in Supply Networks: Relational and Environmental Effects

Reusen

Stouthuysen

Roodhooft

et al. 2020

J Supply Chain Manag

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This study investigates the imitative use of management practices across a multitier supply network. Although imitation may take the form of any management practice, operationally, we focus on whether the buyer's control practices used with first-tier suppliers results in similar control practices being used by these first-tier suppliers with the second-tier suppliers. Drawing on institutional theory, we identify relational context (i.e., affective commitment) and environmental context (i.e., environmental uncertainty) as two important factors influencing the extent to which such imitation takes place. Using unique survey data of vertically linked supply chain triads, we generally find support for the occurrence of imitation and more so in cases of high affective commitment. The results regarding environmental uncertainty further reveal selectivity in imitative behavior, calling attention to the level of deliberateness in imitation decisions in supply networks. Besides contributing to theory on imitative behaviors in the supply chain, this study also generates practical implications on the spread of management practices across multiple tiers.

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Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imitation of Management Practices in Supply Networks: Relational and Environmental Effects

Reusen

Stouthuysen

Roodhooft

et al. 2020

J Supply Chain Manag

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show abstract

“…Since linking pay to performance can expose suppliers to considerable financial risk, this method of contracting has traditionally been deemed ineffective in achieving performance outcomes that are satisfactory to buyers, when performance outcomes are not (entirely) under the control of suppliers (Eisenhardt, 1989;Zu and Kaynak, 2012). We tested this notion in the context of service triads, where there is outcome uncertainty due to both buyers and suppliers being involved in providing the service (Bastl et al, 2019). While our study confirms that PBC is less effective to induce suppliers to deliver performance outcomes that are satisfactory to buyers when performance outcomes are uncertain (H1 is supported), we find that the supplier's propensity to engage in shirking behavior can be mitigated by using particular combinations of PBC and BBC.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mitigating Shirking Contracting Performance in Buyer-Initiated Service Triads

Nullmeier¹,

Wynstra

Valk

2020

The Oxford Handbook of Supply Chain Management

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Buyers that operate in buyer-initiated service triads must deal with the repercussions of service suppliers failing to satisfy the buyer’s customer. Performance-based contracting (PBC) can be used to shift the risks associated with performance shortfalls to service suppliers. Attaining specified performance outcomes can, however, be highly uncertain in service triads where there are many factors outside the supplier’s control. In such situations of high outcome uncertainty, suppliers may be induced to shirk their responsibilities since the direct customer–supplier link inherent to triadic structures gives suppliers an opportunity to engage in shirking without being detected. According to established theory, PBC is less effective in such situations, and behavior-based contracting (BBC) is more effective in achieving performance outcomes that are satisfactory to buyers. However, these insights are based on the long-standing assumption that PBC and BBC are substitutes. This assumption has been criticized as not being representative of empirical reality. Therefore, this chapter studies whether combining these contracting approaches during the contract design and contract management phases mitigates shirking of responsibility by suppliers. Using a data set derived from a survey questionnaire, the chapter finds that combining PBC and BBC during the contract design phase does not reduce shirking. However, the results do reveal that responsibility shirking can be mitigated by combining PBC and BBC during the contract management phase. This study provides purchasing managers with new insights concerning how to use PBC to achieve satisfactory performance outcomes, even in uncertain contexts such as service triads.

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“…More recent studies have begun to examine both control and coordination in governing service triads (e.g. Bastl et al, 2019). We extend the work by Bastl et al (2019) by focusing on coordination in service triads and examining steering and connecting coordination functions (Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

“…While the concept of triadic control has received some more attention (for example, Li and Choi, 2009;van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 2011), prior studies offer limited insights regarding the concept of coordination (a notable exemption is Bastl et al, 2019), despite its (Oliveira and Lumineau, 2017). Consequently, our study focuses on coordination in service triads.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We address this research question by investigating two service triads, consisting of a buyer (part of a government department), a customer (a military service) and two professional service providers. We follow the call by Bastl et al (2019) to focus on all three actors in a service triad to better understand coordination, thus offering a more detailed investigation of the triad by not only focusing on a single actor (e.g., Li and Choi, 2009) or a single dyad (e.g., Karatzas et al, 2016) within a triad. The research draws on rich secondary data including an official report into the causes of the in-service loss of a UK aircraft and its crew, and in particular, on the evidence presented regarding the development of a complex safety case for this type of aircraft.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The manifestation of coordination failures in service triads

Kalra

Lewis

Roehrich

2020

SCM

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate governance in service triads, specifically studying significant steering and connecting coordination failures, to reveal typically hidden characteristics and consequences. Design/methodology/approach This study focuses on coordination functions and activities between a buyer (a government department), a customer (a military service) and two service providers. Rich data on these normally confidential service ties are drawn from an official report into the causes of a fatal accident involving a UK reconnaissance aircraft and specifically from the evidence presented regarding the earlier development of its complex safety case. The authors also analysed a range of additional secondary data sources. Findings The authors examine the sources, drivers and manifestation of coordination failures. The authors uncover a series of coordination failures driven from the bridge position, revealing that while bounded rationality and opportunism influenced steering coordination failures, connecting coordination failures were associated with knowledge asymmetry, dyadic inertia and unethical practices. Practical implications Organisations and governments delivering complex projects and knowledge-intensive professional services should guard against outsourcing the “coordination” activity to a third party, thereby relinquishing the bridge position. Handing over the bridge position to an integrator would leave the client vulnerable to coordination dysfunctions such as bounded rationality, opportunism, knowledge asymmetry, dyadic inertia and unethical practices. Originality/value The study links the previously separate research streams of service triads and inter-organizational coordination. While extant research pays attention to mainly positive control functions, this study focuses on all three actors in two (failed) service triads – and highlights the impact of coordination activities and failures.

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A Mid‐Range Theory of Control and Coordination in Service Triads

Cited by 27 publications

References 76 publications

Imitation of Management Practices in Supply Networks: Relational and Environmental Effects

Imitation of Management Practices in Supply Networks: Relational and Environmental Effects

Mitigating Shirking Contracting Performance in Buyer-Initiated Service Triads

The manifestation of coordination failures in service triads

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