A Mechanism Design Approach to Blockchain Protocols

Ray, Abhishek; Ventresca, Mario; Wan, Hong

doi:10.1109/cybermatics_2018.2018.00268

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…The auction is a representative example of mechanism design in a blockchain environment with randomness and information disclosure [ 36 ]. Based on this possibility, a previous study [ 35 ] provided the framework that analyzes the blockchain protocol using mechanism design and game theory. These studies [ 35 , 36 ] suggested that mechanism design can be applied to the blockchain system, especially to the health care blockchain economy, thereby resulting in the development of a basic token economy.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Based on this possibility, a previous study [ 35 ] provided the framework that analyzes the blockchain protocol using mechanism design and game theory. These studies [ 35 , 36 ] suggested that mechanism design can be applied to the blockchain system, especially to the health care blockchain economy, thereby resulting in the development of a basic token economy. We wanted to make ground truth models for the token economy of patient participation and data provision in personal health records.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Classical mechanism design theories have been examined on some apps, such as Auction [ 34 ]. However, there has been no research linking apps in the blockchain system to mechanism design, which is considered to be representative token design theory for blockchain [ 35 - 38 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mechanism Design of Health Care Blockchain System Token Economy: Development Study Based on Simulated Real-World Scenarios

Jung¹,

Kim²,

Hwang³

et al. 2021

J Med Internet Res

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Background Despite the fact that the adoption rate of electronic health records has increased dramatically among high-income nations, it is still difficult to properly disseminate personal health records. Token economy, through blockchain smart contracts, can better distribute personal health records by providing incentives to patients. However, there have been very few studies regarding the particular factors that should be considered when designing incentive mechanisms in blockchain. Objective The aim of this paper is to provide 2 new mathematical models of token economy in real-world scenarios on health care blockchain platforms. Methods First, roles were set for the health care blockchain platform and its token flow. Second, 2 scenarios were introduced: collecting life-log data for an incentive program at a life insurance company to motivate customers to exercise more and recruiting participants for clinical trials of anticancer drugs. In our 2 scenarios, we assumed that there were 3 stakeholders: participants, data recipients (companies), and data providers (health care organizations). We also assumed that the incentives are initially paid out to participants by data recipients, who are focused on minimizing economic and time costs by adapting mechanism design. This concept can be seen as a part of game theory, since the willingness-to-pay of data recipients is important in maintaining the blockchain token economy. In both scenarios, the recruiting company can change the expected recruitment time and number of participants. Suppose a company considers the recruitment time to be more important than the number of participants and rewards. In that case, the company can increase the time weight and adjust cost. When the reward parameter is fixed, the corresponding expected recruitment time can be obtained. Among the reward and time pairs, the pair that minimizes the company’s cost was chosen. Finally, the optimized results were compared with the simulations and analyzed accordingly. Results To minimize the company’s costs, reward–time pairs were first collected. It was observed that the expected recruitment time decreased as rewards grew, while the rewards decreased as time cost grew. Therefore, the cost was represented by a convex curve, which made it possible to obtain a minimum—an optimal point—for both scenarios. Through sensitivity analysis, we observed that, as the time weight increased, the optimized reward increased, while the optimized time decreased. Moreover, as the number of participants increased, the optimization reward and time also increased. Conclusions In this study, we were able to model the incentive mechanism of blockchain based on a mechanism design that recruits participants through a health care blockchain platform. This study presents a basic approach to incentive modeling in personal health records, demonstrating how health care organizations and funding companies can motivate one another to join the platform.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Mechanism Design of Health Care Blockchain System Token Economy: Development Study Based on Simulated Real-World Scenarios

Jung¹,

Kim²,

Hwang³

et al. 2021

J Med Internet Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Classical mechanism design theories have been examined on some apps, such as Auction [34]. However, there has been no research linking apps in the blockchain system to mechanism design, which is considered to be representative token design theory for blockchain [35][36][37][38].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism Design of Health Care Blockchain System Token Economy: Development Study Based on Simulated Real-World Scenarios (Preprint)

Jung¹,

Kim²,

Hwang³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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BACKGROUND Despite the fact that the adoption rate of electronic health records has increased dramatically among high-income nations, it is still difficult to properly disseminate personal health records. Token economy, through blockchain smart contracts, can better distribute personal health records by providing incentives to patients. However, there have been very few studies regarding the particular factors that should be considered when designing incentive mechanisms in blockchain. OBJECTIVE The aim of this paper is to provide 2 new mathematical models of token economy in real-world scenarios on health care blockchain platforms. METHODS First, roles were set for the health care blockchain platform and its token flow. Second, 2 scenarios were introduced: collecting life-log data for an incentive program at a life insurance company to motivate customers to exercise more and recruiting participants for clinical trials of anticancer drugs. In our 2 scenarios, we assumed that there were 3 stakeholders: participants, data recipients (companies), and data providers (health care organizations). We also assumed that the incentives are initially paid out to participants by data recipients, who are focused on minimizing economic and time costs by adapting mechanism design. This concept can be seen as a part of game theory, since the willingness-to-pay of data recipients is important in maintaining the blockchain token economy. In both scenarios, the recruiting company can change the expected recruitment time and number of participants. Suppose a company considers the recruitment time to be more important than the number of participants and rewards. In that case, the company can increase the time weight and adjust cost. When the reward parameter is fixed, the corresponding expected recruitment time can be obtained. Among the reward and time pairs, the pair that minimizes the company’s cost was chosen. Finally, the optimized results were compared with the simulations and analyzed accordingly. RESULTS To minimize the company’s costs, reward–time pairs were first collected. It was observed that the expected recruitment time decreased as rewards grew, while the rewards decreased as time cost grew. Therefore, the cost was represented by a convex curve, which made it possible to obtain a minimum—an optimal point—for both scenarios. Through sensitivity analysis, we observed that, as the time weight increased, the optimized reward increased, while the optimized time decreased. Moreover, as the number of participants increased, the optimization reward and time also increased. CONCLUSIONS In this study, we were able to model the incentive mechanism of blockchain based on a mechanism design that recruits participants through a health care blockchain platform. This study presents a basic approach to incentive modeling in personal health records, demonstrating how health care organizations and funding companies can motivate one another to join the platform.

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Applications of Blockchain Technologies in Health Services: A General Framework for Policymakers

Kara

Kurutkan

2021

Accounting, Finance, Sustainability, Governance &Amp; Fraud: Theory and Application

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A Mechanism Design Approach to Blockchain Protocols

Cited by 3 publications

References 17 publications

Mechanism Design of Health Care Blockchain System Token Economy: Development Study Based on Simulated Real-World Scenarios

Mechanism Design of Health Care Blockchain System Token Economy: Development Study Based on Simulated Real-World Scenarios

Mechanism Design of Health Care Blockchain System Token Economy: Development Study Based on Simulated Real-World Scenarios (Preprint)

Applications of Blockchain Technologies in Health Services: A General Framework for Policymakers

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