A mathematical model of the effect of subsidy transfer in cooperative advertising using differential game theory

Ezimadu, Peter E.

doi:10.1007/s40092-018-0296-0

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 46 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…measures the sensitivity of product demand to the advertising effort. In accordance with the previous literatures (Ezimadu, 2019;Shi & Petrosyan, 2018;Wang, Gou, Choi, & Liang, 2016), the quadratic cost functions about advertising efforts are proposed below:…”

Section: Advertising Model With Multiple Delaysmentioning

confidence: 71%

Application of optimal control to the dynamic advertising decisions for supply chain with multiple delays

Bai

Chen

et al. 2020

Systems Science & Control Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper is concerned with application problem of optimal control to a class of dynamic advertising models with multiple delays. Here, a dynamic model with state and control delays is introduced to describe the impacts of advertising delayed and memory effects on the evolution of brand goodwill. In the decentralized and centralized systems, the optimal advertising strategies of supply chain members are presented by utilizing the nonzero-sum differential game governed by differential equation with multiple delays in state and control variables. Special effort is made to analyse the geometrical shapes of advertising strategy and provide the optimal decision structure of supply chain system. Furthermore, nonzero-sum stochastic differential game is applied to explore the dynamic advertising decision problems of supply chain system with the multiple delays and stochastic cases. Finally, numerical examples are exploited to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed results.

show abstract

Section: Advertising Model With Multiple Delaysmentioning

confidence: 71%

Application of optimal control to the dynamic advertising decisions for supply chain with multiple delays

Bai

Chen

et al. 2020

Systems Science & Control Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We will determine the equilibrium through backward induction. Thus based on the distributor's decision, the retailer's optimal problem is given by In his anticipation of the retailer's reaction, the distributor will consider the optimal problem Also, based on his anticipation of the distributor's reaction, the manufacturer's optimal problem is The idea of a three-level supply channel game-theoretic model was first conceived by [31] in a cooperative advertising model, with a clear incorporation of resource transfer in the form of subsidy in [32] with a bypass of the middle-man in [33] for the first time.…”

Section: Decision Sequencementioning

confidence: 99%

A Three-Level Game-Theoretic Trade Credit Model in a Supply Channel

Ezimadu

2023

JAMCS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Two-party channel setting has been a choice study-setting for trade credit. This work considers a three-member channel setting using Stackelberg game theory. The study considers the manufacturer as the channel leader, with the distributor as the first follower, and the retailer as the last follower. The manufacturer gives credit goods to the distributor, who similarly gives credit goods to the retailer. The retailer engages in the promotion of the product. Using a promotion effort, price margins and credit periods dependent credit functions, the work examines three game-theoretic models on the manufacturer, the distributor and the retailer’s payoffs. The work uses backward induction to determine the promotion effort, the credit period and the payoffs. It observes that the margins are motivational enough to drive product promotion which reduces with credit period so that in the long-run the promotion effort stabilizes. The work further observes that the distributor’s involvement is very crucial to the payoffs.

show abstract

“…We note that a similar approach was adopted by [27] which is the first to consider a Stackelberg cooperative advertising model with two followers using differential game. Another such approach was adopted by [28] where four channel structures were considered.…”

Section: The Game Decision Trendmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Game-Theoretic Credit Period and Promotion Model in a Supplier-Retailer Channel

Ezimadu

2022

ARJOM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It has been established that trade credit can be influenced by a lot of factors. However, no specific function has been used to neither represent these factors nor consider their effects. This paper considers a supplier-retailer Stackelberg game in which the supplier as the channel leader supplies credit goods to the retailer who in-turn sells to the consumers. It uses a credit function based on credit period, supplier’s price margin and product promotion effort to model the players’ payoffs. The work considers two game scenarios: a situation involving the provision of trade credit and a situation without trade credit. The work obtains a closed-form solution for the credit period for the credit provision scenario, and the promotion efforts and payoffs for both scenarios, and shows that credit period prolongation may not be in favour of the retailer, and that the retailer can attain a larger payoff than the supplier. It also shows that the retailer’s margin is very crucial for both channel scenarios, and observes that the players are better-off with trade credit.

show abstract

A mathematical model of the effect of subsidy transfer in cooperative advertising using differential game theory

Cited by 4 publications

References 46 publications

Application of optimal control to the dynamic advertising decisions for supply chain with multiple delays

Application of optimal control to the dynamic advertising decisions for supply chain with multiple delays

A Three-Level Game-Theoretic Trade Credit Model in a Supply Channel

A Game-Theoretic Credit Period and Promotion Model in a Supplier-Retailer Channel

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About