A logic of belief.

Blum, Alex

doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1093887626

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…I am setting such misgivings aside, however, to focus on a more fundamental ontological issue: Doris's notion of local traits is parasitic on the notion of local situations —situations similar enough to warrant the application of a trait. But as Blum (2003) points out, Doris fails to specify the concept of a situation that can play the required role for him. Blum does not develop a detailed objection which goes to the heart of the situationist project; he simply mentions it in passing.…”

Section: The Situationism–dispositionism Debate In Philosophy Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Situationism and the Concept of a Situation

Kristjánsson¹

2011

European J of Philosophy

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The concept of a situation underlying the debate between moral situationists and dispositionists conceals various underexplored complexities. Some of those issues have been engaged recently in the so‐called psychology of situations, but they have been slow to receive attention in mainstream philosophy. I invoke various distinctions among situations, and show how situationists have selectively chosen certain types of situations that, for conceptual reasons, skew the argument in their favour. I introduce the concept of a ‘virtue‐calibrated situation’, and argue that if the person–situation debate is to move forward in philosophy as it has in psychology, it must focus on such situations. I bring to bear evidence from analytic and continental philosophy, as well as from social and personality psychology.

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Section: The Situationism–dispositionism Debate In Philosophy Andmentioning

confidence: 99%