A Logic for Reasoning About Game Descriptions

Zhang, Dongmo

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03991-2_4

Cited by 6 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…For every w ∈ W and d ∈ r∈N A r , we call (w, d) a move. Given a group of agents G ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, we write (w, d G , d -G ) instead of (w, d) when we want to talk about G's part in (w, d), where d -G ∈ s∈N\G A s denotes the actions of all the agents except those in G in the joint action d. Our notion of move resembles the turn-based definition proposed in [21] and [22]. Clearly relation ≈ r is reflexive, transitive and symmetric.…”

Section: Finite Subset Of Integer Numbers Representing the Range Of V...mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Epistemic Reasoning About Rationality and Bids in Auctions

Mittelmann

Herzig

Perrussel

2021

Logics in Artificial Intelligence

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we investigate strategic reasoning in the context of auctions. More precisely, we establish an explicit link between bidding actions and bounded rationality. To do so, we extend the Auction Description Language with an epistemic operator and an action choice operator and use it to represent a classical auction where agents have imperfect information about other agents' valuations. We formalize bounded rationality concepts in iterative protocols and show how to use them to reason about the players' actions. Finally, we provide a model checking algorithm.

show abstract

Section: Finite Subset Of Integer Numbers Representing the Range Of V...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our contribution is twofold. We first extend ADL with knowledge operators from Epistemic GDL [12] and the action modality from the GDL variant proposed in [21]. This extension aims at providing the ground for the design of General Auction Players.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Reasoning About Rationality and Bids in Auctions

Mittelmann

Herzig

Perrussel

2021

Logics in Artificial Intelligence

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For this however, we need a language that allows the agents to communicate such joint strategies in a concise way. This could be potentially be achieved by making use of a recently introduced logical language called SGL [43], which indeed allows agents to describe (joint) strategies.…”

Section: Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic negotiations for extensive-form games

Jonge

Zhang

2019

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When studying extensive-form games it is commonly assumed that players make their decisions individually. One usually does not allow the possibility for the players to negotiate their respective strategies and formally commit themselves to future moves. As a consequence, many non-zero-sum games have been shown to have equilibrium outcomes that are suboptimal and arguably counter-intuitive. For this reason we feel there is a need to explore a new line of research in which game-playing agents are allowed to negotiate binding agreements before they make their moves. We analyze what happens under such assumptions and define a new equilibrium solution concept to capture this. We show that this new solution concept indeed yields solutions that are more efficient and, in a sense, closer to what one would expect in the real world. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our ideas are not only theoretical in nature, but can also be implemented on bounded rational agents, with a number of experiments conducted with a new algorithm that combines techniques from Automated Negotiations, (Algorithmic) Game Theory, and General Game Playing. Our algorithm, which we call Monte Carlo Negotiation Search, is an adaptation of Monte Carlo Tree Search that equips the agent with the ability to negotiate. It is completely domain-independent in the sense that it is not tailored to any specific game. It can be applied to any non-zero-sum game, provided that its rules are described in Game Description Language. We show with several experiments that it strongly outperforms non-negotiating players, and that it closely approximates the theoretically optimal outcomes, as defined by our new solution concept. KeywordsAutomated negotiations • Non-zero-sum games • Extensive-form games • General game playing • Monte Carlo tree search

show abstract

“…Zhang and Thielscher propose a dynamic extension of GDL for reasoning about game strategies, and develop a sound and complete axiomatic system for this logic [24]. With different languages and semantics, their axiomatization and techniques to prove the completeness are different from ours.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Axiomatization of Epistemic GDL

Jiang

Perrussel

Zhang

2017

Logic, Rationality, and Interaction

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Game Description Language (GDL) has been introduced as an official language for specifying games in the AAAI General Game Playing Competition since 2005. It was originally designed as a declarative language for representing rules of arbitrary games with perfect information. More recently, an epistemic extension of GDL, called EGDL, has been proposed for representing and reasoning about imperfect information games. In this paper, we develop an axiomatic system for a variant of EGDL and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to the semantics based on the epistemic state transition model. With a combination of action symbols, temporal modalities and epistemic operators, the completeness proof requires novel combinations of techniques used for completeness of propositional dynamic logic and epistemic temporal logic. We demonstrate how to use the proof theory for inferring game properties from game rules.

show abstract

A Logic for Reasoning About Game Descriptions

Cited by 6 publications

References 13 publications

Epistemic Reasoning About Rationality and Bids in Auctions

Epistemic Reasoning About Rationality and Bids in Auctions

Strategic negotiations for extensive-form games

On Axiomatization of Epistemic GDL

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About