A lightweight and secure two factor anonymous authentication protocol for Global Mobility Networks

Abstract

Global Mobility Networks(GLOMONETs) in wireless communication permits the global roaming services that enable a user to leverage the mobile services in any foreign country. Technological growth in wireless communication is also accompanied by new security threats and challenges. A threat-proof authentication protocol in wireless communication may overcome the security flaws by allowing only legitimate users to access a particular service. Recently, Lee et al. found Mun et al. scheme vulnerable to different attacks and proposed an advanced secure scheme to overcome the security flaws. However, this article points out that Lee et al. scheme lacks user anonymity, inefficient user authentication, vulnerable to replay and DoS attacks and Lack of local password verification. Furthermore, this article presents a more robust anonymous authentication scheme to handle the threats and challenges found in Lee et al.’s protocol. The proposed protocol is formally verified with an automated tool(ProVerif). The proposed protocol has superior efficiency in comparison to the existing protocols.

AMAPG: Advanced Mobile Authentication Protocol for GLOMONET

“…Lee et al also in [23] introduced another scheme, but they emphasized that their protocol suffers from logical errors and denial-ofservice attacks of the registration phase. In 2018, Baig et al proposed a new lightweight scheme to solve these issues [24]. However, in [25] have been shown the Baig et al's scheme cannot provide user privacy.…”

“…On the other hand, the detailed security analysis of AMAPG and its formal security verification using Scyther tool confirms that it provides desired security against different attacks. To keep In the term of computational costs, as depicted in Table 7 and Figure 8, the Baig et al [24] and AMAPG schemes require the least amount of time for calculations, respectively. Focusing on the M U computation analysis as it is the resource constrain device, it can easily seen in Table 7, the Baig et al [24] and AMAPG schemes in their M U side require 6T h and 9T h , respectively which are the fastest.…”

Lightweight user authentication scheme for roaming service in GLOMONET with privacy preserving

“…Likewise, Lee et al found that the scheme proposed by Mun et al is not safe from man-in-the-middle and masquerade attacks, and perfect forward secrecy is also not satisfactory [11]. Lee et al proposed a scheme to solve these security problems, but they highlighted that this scheme is also vulnerable to logical errors and denialof-service attacks of the registration phase, similar to the scheme proposed by Ahmed et al Then, Ahmed et al proposed a new lightweight scheme to address these issues [12]. However, as we mentioned earlier in this subsection, Ahmed et al's scheme cannot completely provide user privacy and other security features.…”

“…We considered not only the privacy preserving mentioned in Section 3.4, but also other security requirements to consider in the GLOMONET environment [33]. Table 2 compares privacy preserving, security attack resistance and some security requirements of our proposed scheme and other related schemes [4,9,11,12,34].…”

A Robust Device-to-Device Continuous Authentication Protocol for the Internet of Things

“…Any security protocol needs to achieve backward secrecy to protect future sessions or communication [31]. Backward secrecy ensures that even if the attacker gains the secret session key, he will not be in a position to compromise the future session keys [48]. The proposed protocol ensures backward secrecy in both phases.…”