Lightweight user authentication scheme for roaming service in GLOMONET with privacy preserving

Abstract

With the development of information technology and the Internet, users can conveniently use roaming services without time and space restrictions. This roaming service is initiated by establishing a session key between a home node, which exists in a home network, and a mobile node, which exists in a foreign network. However, in the process of verifying a legitimate user and establishing a session key, various security threats and privacy exposure issues can arise. This study demonstrates that the authentication scheme for the roaming service proposed in the existing Global Mobility Network (GLOMONET) environment has several vulnerabilities and, hence, is impractical. In addition, the scheme does not satisfy the privacy of the session key or user’s identity or password. Accordingly, we propose a new lightweight authentication scheme to compensate for these vulnerabilities and secure a high level of privacy, such as non-traceability. In addition, formal and informal analyses are conducted to examine the safety of the proposed scheme. Based on the results of our analyses, we prove that the proposed scheme is highly secure and applicable to the actual GLOMONET environment.

An Improved Lightweight User Authentication Scheme for the Internet of Medical Things

“…For security analysis in our scheme, we consider the following attack model [ 20 , 21 , 22 ]: The attacker can extract the data in the device that stores some security parameters. The attacker can access the public communication channel, at which point the attacker can interrupt, return, amend and eliminate or transmit the message.…”

AMAPG: Advanced Mobile Authentication Protocol for GLOMONET

“…In 2018, Baig et al proposed a new lightweight scheme to solve these issues [24]. However, in [25] have been shown the Baig et al's scheme cannot provide user privacy. They also proposed a new lightweight scheme and claimed their scheme provides user untraceability and privacy and resistance against identity/password guessing attacks.…”

“…The time of the hash function i.e. T h is considered to be 0.038 milliseconds using [25]. Comparing AMAPG with its predecessor i.e.…”

“…respectively denote Component, Registration phase, Login & Authentication phase and Total Time (ms). In this table T h = 0.038(ms) based on[25]…”

Improved Secure and Lightweight Authentication Scheme for Next-Generation IoT Infrastructure

“…(3) A can obtain the information in the smart card and the information transmitted by the user on the secure channel during the registration process [25]. (4) A can simultaneously obtain the information in the smart card and perform offline password guessing as stated in [26,27]. (5) A can know any two of the user's password, smart card, and biological information.…”