A life scientist, an engineer and a social scientist walk into a lab: challenges of dual-use engagement and education in synthetic biology

Abstract

The discussion of dual-use education is often predicated on a discrete population of practicing life scientists exhibiting certain deficiencies in awareness or expertise. This has lead to the claim that there is a greater requirement for awareness raising and education amongst this population. However, there is yet to be an inquiry into the impact of the 'convergent' nature of emerging techno-sciences upon the prospects of dual-use education. The field of synthetic biology, although often portrayed as homogeneous, is in fact composed of various sub-fields and communities. Its practitioners have diverse academic backgrounds. The research institutions that have fostered its development in the UK often have their own sets of norms and practices in engagement with ethical, legal and social issues associated with scientific knowledge and technologies. The area is also complicated by the emergence of synthetic biologists outside traditional research environments, the so called 'do-it-yourself' or 'garage biologists'. This paper untangles some of the complexities in the current state of synthetic biology and addresses the prospects for dual-use education for practitioners. It provides a short overview of the field and discusses identified dual-use issues. There follows a discussion of UK networks in synthetic biology, including their engagement with ethical, legal, social and dual-use issues and limited educational efforts in relation to these. It concludes by outlining options for developing a more systematic dual-use education strategy for synthetic biology.

Synthetic Biology for the Development of Biodrugs and Designer Crops and the Emerging Governance Issues

“…There is a consensus on importance of measures to mitigate threat that prepares a country to combat bioterrorism arising out of synthetic biology based research (Suk et al 2011). Monitoring of research, competitions, and especially of 'do it yourself' projects is essential to ensure biosecurity (Edwards and Kelle 2012). If effective strategies to curb easy access to the tools are not developed in the right time, monitoring its use would be even further more challenging.…”

Negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge: The case of dual use and synthetic biology

“…As a result, there is considerable focus on the need to “educate” scientists about “ethics” and to make them “aware” of the potential misuse of their research by “hostile” actors. This framing is evident, for example, in the articles published in a special issue of Medicine, Conflict and Survival entitled “Preventing the hostile use of the life sciences and biotechnologies: Fostering a culture of biosecurity and dual use awareness” ( Dando, 2012 ), which includes one article devoted to synthetic biology ( Edwards and Kelle, 2012 ).…”

Taking Stock of Security Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology in an Age of Responsible Innovation

“…This means that the issue often competes with more established issues on the ELSI agenda. Security concerns have been more dominant in a US context, but less pronounced in a European ELSI context (12). Added to this, misuse concerns have emerged at a time in which the very concept and practice of ELSI governance is being made subject to transformation.…”