A Leverage-Based Measure of Financial Instability

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe employ a model of leverage-induced explosive behavior in financial markets to develop a measure of financial market instability. Specifically, we derive a quantitative condition for how large levered investors can become relative to the whole market before the demand curve for securities suddenly becomes upward-sloping and small price declines cascade as levered investors are forced to liquidate. The size and leverage of all levered investors and the elasticity of demand of unlevered investors define the minimum market size for stability (or MinMaSS), the smallest market size that can support a given group of levered investors. The ratio of actual market size to MinMaSS, termed the instability ratio, can give regulators and policymakers advance warning of financial crises. We apply the instability ratio in an investigation of the 1998 demise of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. We find that a forced liquidation of the fund threatened to destabilize some financial markets, particularly the markets for bank funding and equity volatility.

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