A Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Based on Third-Party Recycling

Su, Jiafu; Li, Chi; Qing-jun, Zeng; Yang, Jiaquan; Jie, Zhang

doi:10.3390/su11195335

Cited by 81 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(34 reference statements)

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“…en, the retailer reacts to determine the product's retail price P i . Finally, the retailer sells products to consumers to meet market demand [24][25][26]. All members are rational and pursue own benefit maximization.…”

Section: Definitions and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coordination of Supply Chains with Competing Manufacturers considering Fairness Concerns

et al. 2020

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In this study, we examined the contract coordination between manufacturers with peer-induced and distributional fairness concerns. A revenue sharing contract was introduced to coordinate a competitive supply chain, in which the manufacturers have different fairness concerns based on centralized decision-making in terms of fairness neutrality. Then, we constructed two game models—the manufacturer’s peer-induced fairness concern model and the manufacturer’s distributional fairness concern model and analyzed the influence of a revenue sharing contract on the pricing decisions and profit distribution of a competitive supply chain considering fairness concerns. The results show that there is a revenue-sharing contract parameter in both the peer-induced and distributional fairness concerns of manufacturers, which can effectively realize Pareto improvements in a supply chain. Meanwhile, the retail and wholesale prices both decreased with the increase in the revenue-sharing ratio between retailers and manufacturers, and the profits of retailers decreased accordingly, but the overall utility of manufacturers and supply chains improved markedly. Moreover, the coordination condition is closely related to the level of fairness concerns of the manufacturers and the competition intensity between two manufacturers. The sharing contract designed in this study can not only effectively improve the utility of retailers and manufacturers but also enhance the total utility of the channel to ensure that node enterprises have long-term, stable, and cooperative relationships and to strengthen the overall competitiveness of the supply chain.

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Section: Definitions and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…en, we put equations (24) and (25) into equations (20) and 22, and we get the optimal utility of the manufacturer when manufacturers distribute the equity concern:…”

Section: Decentralized Decision-making When Manufacturersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of Supply Chains with Competing Manufacturers considering Fairness Concerns

et al. 2020

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“…Su Jiafu et al (2019) established a two-stage closed-loop supply chain game model. In terms of the influence of the environmental protection input on the whole supply chain, the different choices will have impacts on the benefits of the whole supply chain when manufacturers select a closed-loop supply chain model of third-party recycling [41]. Xu Lang et al (2018) compared the decisions and profits in the centralized and decentralized scenarios, where a contract through revenue and cost sharing was provided to achieve the supply chain coordination in the framework of Nash negotiation, and the coefficient of sharing was obtained to improve the performance [42].…”

Section: Remanufacturing Supply Chain With Recycling Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

CSR Remanufacturing Supply Chains under WTP Differentiation

et al. 2020

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With the shortage of global resources and the call for sustainable development, the remanufacturing supply chain and the corporate social responsibility of enterprises have attracted extensive attention from scholars. This paper studies a manufacturer-retailer corporate social responsibility (CSR) remanufacturing supply chain in which the manufacturer collects the used products grounded in the willingness to pay (WTP) differentiation. Different from previous literature, this paper first adds WTP differences to the CSR remanufacturing supply chain. Next, we analyze the manufacturer exhibiting CSR activity by Stackelberg game theory in both centralized and decentralized models with a consideration of prices, recycling, consumer surplus, and profits for the chain players in the two models with different CSR ratios. Through calculation and analyses of the models, we note that the chain members have the best status when the consumers’ WTP for new and remanufactured products is within a threshold. Subsequently, we compare the optimal price decisions and the expected profits in the decentralized and centralized systems, and we find that the retail price, wholesale price, and recycling rate decrease with a rising CSR under WTP differentiation. The centralized retail price is lower than the decentralized one. Conversely, the profit is higher when the increment of demand is higher. On top of that, in common cases, the pure and total profits of manufacturing are ascending while the retailer’s profit is descending. We also find that the consumer surplus is increasing in two cases. Finally, to motivate the players in the supply chain to engage in CSR activity, we consider the revenue sharing contract. From the perspective of WTP differences, this paper studies CSR remanufacturing, which has certain influences on the sustainable development of the economy.

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“…Based on the analysis above, it can be concluded that the former research on vehicle routing problems with time windows (VRPTW) and PEP focused on the factors of traffic congestion, vehicle composition and vehicle load, etc., rather than multi-path vehicle routing problems [21][22][23]. Therefore, a multi-path mixed-integer mathematical programming model with a time window was established, which aimed to optimize fuel cost, driver cost, vehicle depreciation and time-window penalty cost and determine the exact solution using CPLEX in Java.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Path-Based Selection Solution Approach for the Low Carbon Vehicle Routing Problem with a Time-Window Constraint

Wang

2020

Applied Sciences

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Due to the gradual improvement of urban traffic network construction and the increasing number of optional paths between any two points, how to optimize a vehicle travel path in a multi-path road network and then improve the efficiency of urban distribution has become a difficult problem for logistics companies. For this purpose, a mixed-integer mathematical programming model with a time window based on multiple paths for urban distribution in a multi-path environment is established and its exact solution solved using software CPLEX. Additionally, in order to test the application and feasibility of the model, simulation experiments were performed on the four parameters of time, distance, cost, and fuel consumption. Furthermore, using Jingdong (JD), the main urban area in Chongqing, as an example, the experimental results reveal that an algorithm that considers the path selection can significantly improve the efficiency of urban distribution in metropolitan areas with complex road structures.

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A Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Based on Third-Party Recycling

Cited by 81 publications

References 31 publications

Coordination of Supply Chains with Competing Manufacturers considering Fairness Concerns

Coordination of Supply Chains with Competing Manufacturers considering Fairness Concerns

CSR Remanufacturing Supply Chains under WTP Differentiation

A Path-Based Selection Solution Approach for the Low Carbon Vehicle Routing Problem with a Time-Window Constraint

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