A game theoretic approach to investigate the effects of third-party logistics in a sustainable supply chain by reducing delivery time and carbon emissions

Jamali, Mohammad-Bagher; Rasti−Barzoki, Morteza

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.06.348

Cited by 59 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…erefore, the difference λ 1 − λ 2 determines the number of consumers who give up buying the nongreen product. A similar assumption can be found in earlier studies [15,18,43]. Assumption 3.…”

Section: Assumptionsupporting

confidence: 63%

“…Li et al [42] addressed the transportation outsourcing problems of a supply chain under various carbon tax policies and found that a strict carbon tax policy and increasing energy prices can force a manufacturer to outsource more transportation services to a professional 3PL firm. Jamali and Rasti-Barzoki [43] investigated the effects of reduced carbon emissions by a 3PL firm on the profitability of a three-echelon supply chain and asserted that in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 3PL firms should deliver products to retailers using green transportation means. Consequently, the reduction in carbon emissions by the 3PL firm increases the demand for green as well as nongreen products.…”

Section: 3mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, to the best of the author's knowledge, no research has dealt with all of these issues simultaneously. Also to the best of the author's knowledge, the only paper dealing with the greenness design of a product and 3PL firms' efforts to reduce carbon emissions is that by Jamali and Rasti-Barzoki [43]. erefore, this study focuses on how the ecofriendliness of a manufacturer and efforts to reduce carbon emissions by a 3PL firm affect the profits of supply chain members under various distribution channel structures.…”

Section: Research Gapsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Strategies on Pricing, Greenness Degree, and Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chains under Single and Cross Distributions of Green and Nongreen Products

Lee

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Environmental sustainability has become a critical indicator in evaluations of the success and efficiency of supply chain management. In this study, we consider a two-echelon supply chain composed of two competing manufacturers, two retailers, and one third-party logistics firm. The first manufacturer produces a green product, while the second manufacturer produces a nongreen product. Each of the two retailers can sell only a green product, only a nongreen product, or both green and nongreen products. All products are initially stored by the third-party logistics firm and delivered to the retailers. This study investigates product pricing, the degree of greenness of the first manufacturer’s product, and carbon emission reduction as carried out by the third-party logistics firm. Using a three-stage Stackelberg game framework, we present the equilibrium strategy on pricing, the degree of greenness, and carbon emission reduction for five different distribution channel structures. One of our major findings is that competition between the two manufacturers has a positive influence on the profitability of the supply chain. We also find that it is desirable for each manufacturer to choose a cross-distribution channel for its products considering the sustainability and profitability of the supply chain.

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Section: Assumptionsupporting

confidence: 63%

Section: 3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Research Gapsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategies on Pricing, Greenness Degree, and Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chains under Single and Cross Distributions of Green and Nongreen Products

Lee

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…As ω increases, the price competition between the two recyclers in the supply chain becomes more intense. roughout the paper, it is assumed that β r > ω. e linear type of the demand function considering the price competition is assumed in most studies [20,34,39,46,47]. e collector is responsible for collecting waste in the form of end-of-life products from consumers.…”

Section: Model Description and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

Lee

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.

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“…Most studies on green supply chain coordination issues mainly discuss the production process in the manufacturing industry, for example, how to reduce carbon emissions and improve resource utilization [19][20][21][22]. However, some empirical studies indicate that green marketing plays an important role in promoting green products to achieve supply chain sustainability [23,24].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordinating a Green Agri-Food Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing Contracts Considering Retailers’ Green Marketing Efforts

2020

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Serious environmental issues have drawn the attention of the agricultural sector. Consumers’ concerns about their personal health and food safety have stimulated the demand for green agri-food, which has also made it important to focus on the green agri-food supply chain to improve the food quality and reduce the associated environmental concerns. This paper discusses coordination issues of the green agri-food supply chain under the background of farmers’ green farming and retailers’ green marketing, and the impact of a revenue-sharing contract on key decisions of supply chain participants. On the basis of the two-echelon green agri-food supply chain composed of a farmer and a retailer, a revenue-sharing contract was established that takes the cost of farmer’s green farming and retailer’s green marketing into account. Through the comparison of the model results, it is concluded that the revenue-sharing contract is beneficial to not only increase the greening level, but also improve both the farmer’s profit and the retailer’s profit. Moreover, the effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract is positively correlated with consumers’ sensitivity to the greening level. Finally, the conclusion is verified by numerical simulation and some management suggestions are given.

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A game theoretic approach to investigate the effects of third-party logistics in a sustainable supply chain by reducing delivery time and carbon emissions

Cited by 59 publications

References 57 publications

Strategies on Pricing, Greenness Degree, and Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chains under Single and Cross Distributions of Green and Nongreen Products

Strategies on Pricing, Greenness Degree, and Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chains under Single and Cross Distributions of Green and Nongreen Products

Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

Coordinating a Green Agri-Food Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing Contracts Considering Retailers’ Green Marketing Efforts

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