A game‐based incentive model for service cooperation in VANETs

Mao, Yuxin; Zhu, Ping; Wei, Guiyi; Hassan, Mohammad Mehedi; Hossain, M. Shamim

doi:10.1002/cpe.3340

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Moreover, we will also construct the payoff matrix for players based on the payoff function. The game formulation presented here is an extension to our previous work in [28][29][30].…”

Section: Game Formulation For Energy-aware Dtn Routingmentioning

confidence: 97%

A Game Theoretical Model for Energy-Aware DTN Routing in MANETs with Nodes’ Selfishness

Mao

Zhu

2015

Mobile Netw Appl

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Many existing studies just considered that nodes in a Mobile Ad Hoc NETwork (MANET) would fully cooperate to forward packets for one another. However, this assumption does not hold in many scenarios. The node selfishness in relay cooperation will certainly influence the overall performance of routing in MANE Ts. In this work, we investigate the energy-aware routing problem in MANETs with nodes' selfishness. We model the situation of node cooperation in energy-aware routing by using game theory. We consider the competitive and cooperative relationship between the nodes to formulate the game for MANETs. An incentive mechanism is given in order to encourage forwarding cooperation during energy-aware routing. Nodes are encouraged to forward more data packets for others in order to acquire more services from others. We also carry out a simulation for the proposed method and perform detailed analysis in this work. From the results of the simulation, we argue that it's possible to find out a suitable configuration for a MANET to support more efficient energy-aware routing through our method.

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“…Moreover, we will also construct the payoff matrix for players based on the payoff function. The game formulation presented here is an extension to our previous work in [28][29][30].…”

Section: Game Formulation For Energy-aware Dtn Routingmentioning

confidence: 97%

A Game Theoretical Model for Energy-Aware DTN Routing in MANETs with Nodes’ Selfishness

Mao

Zhu

2015

Mobile Netw Appl

Self Cite

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“…Previous studies have investigated the problem of cooperation in VANETs using game theory, and have utilized a model with pairwise interactions [13][14][15][16][17][18][19]. This means that the effect of each player, or vehicle, is assumed to be limited to only one other companion player.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zhang et al [13] proposed a cooperative information dissemination scheme for vehicular networks using a Markov decision process. Mao et al [15,18] proposed a cooperative content sharing mechanism using evolutionary game theory. Altman et al [16] considered the problem of finding stable cooperative strategies in VANETs using a repeated game approach.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ecological Dynamics and Evolution of Cooperation in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

Sartakhti

Ghajar

2023

Telecom

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In Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), promoting cooperative behavior is a challenging problem for mechanism designers. Cooperative actions, such as disseminating data, can seem at odds with rationality and may benefit other vehicles at a cost to oneself. Without additional mechanisms, it is expected that cooperative behavior in the population will decrease and eventually disappear. Classical game theoretical models for cooperation, such as the public goods game, predict this outcome, but they assume fixed population sizes and overlook the ecological dynamics of the interacting vehicles. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary public goods game that incorporates VANET ecological dynamics and offers new insights for promoting cooperation. Our model considers free spaces, population density, departure rates of vehicles, and randomly composed groups for each data sender. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that higher population densities and departure rates, due to minimum differences between pay-offs of vehicles, promote cooperative behavior. This feedback between ecological dynamics and evolutionary game dynamics leads to interesting results. Our proposed model demonstrates a new extension of evolutionary dynamics to vehicles of varying densities. We show that it is possible to promote cooperation in VANETs without the need for any supporting mechanisms. Future research can investigate the potential for using this model in practical settings.

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“…In barter‐based motivation systems, also known as the tit‐for‐tat (TFT) approach, nodes share the same information. Mao et al 22 proposed a game‐based incentive scheme. Two types of relationship, competitive and cooperative, are considered.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

SOS: Socially omitting selfishness in IoT for smart and connected communities

Rehman

Ghani

Zubair³

et al. 2020

Int J Communication

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Smart and connected communities (SCC) is an emerging field of internet of things (IoT), and it has potential applications to improve human life. The improvement may be in terms of preservation, revitalization, livability, and sustainability of a community. The resources of the nodes and devices in the SCC have certain constraints that may not allow the devices and nodes to cooperate to save their resources such as memory, energy, and buffer, or simply maximize their performance. Thus, to stimulate the nodes to avoid selfish behavior, SSC needs a novel and well-organized solution to motivate nodes for cooperation. This article aims to resolve the issue of selfish behaviors in SCC and to encourage the nodes for cooperation. A novel mechanism, socially omitting selfishness (SOS), has been proposed to manage/eradicate selfishness using a socially oriented election process. The election process elects different heads based on weight and cooperation (using Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves model). The election of heads and incentive mechanism encourages the nodes to show participation and behave as highly cooperative members of the community. Furthermore, an extended version of the Dempster Shafer model has been used to discourage the selfish behavior of the participating nodes in the SOS scheme. It uses different monitoring and gateway nodes to efficiently employ the proposed scheme. A mathematical model has been developed for the aforementioned aspects and simulated through NS2 simulation environment to analyze the performance of SOS. The results of the proposed scheme outperform the contemporary schemes in terms of average delivery delay, packet delivery ratio, throughput, and average energy.

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A game‐based incentive model for service cooperation in VANETs

Cited by 6 publications

References 31 publications

A Game Theoretical Model for Energy-Aware DTN Routing in MANETs with Nodes’ Selfishness

A Game Theoretical Model for Energy-Aware DTN Routing in MANETs with Nodes’ Selfishness

Ecological Dynamics and Evolution of Cooperation in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

SOS: Socially omitting selfishness in IoT for smart and connected communities

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