A further inquiry into FTR properties

Benjamin, Richard M.

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.02.032

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…There are many arguments in favor of financial transmission rights (Benjamin, 2010;Bushnell and Stoft, 1996;Chao and Peck, 1996;Joskow and Tirole, 2000;Hogan, 1992Hogan, , 1999, but in light of the discussion in this paper, there is also the counterargument that power exchanges would completely monopolize the organization of trade across borders, which is currently the territory of OTC markets. Note also that 90% of total trade in Europe is OTC, with the main exception being the Nordic area (that does not have longterm physical transmission rights) where it is only half of trade (Rademaekers et al, 2008).…”

Section: Forward-market Target Modelmentioning

confidence: 93%

Why (and how) to regulate power exchanges in the EU market integration context?

Meeus¹

2011

Energy Policy

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a b s t r a c tThe European Union (EU) market integration is leading to increasingly monopolistic electricity market infrastructures, which has opened a debate on the regulation of these so-called power exchanges. In this paper, we start by stating that there are two types of power exchanges in Europe, i.e. ''merchant'' and ''cost-of-service regulated'' power exchanges. We then discuss how regulation can be used to better align their incentives with the main power exchange tasks. We conclude that adopting the cost-of-service regulated model for all power exchanges in Europe could be counterproductive in the current context, but that regulation can help ensure that the benefits of the EU market integration materialize. Promising regulatory actions include tempering the reinforced market power of power exchanges, and quality-ofservice regulation for the ongoing cooperation among power exchanges to organize trade across borders.

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Section: Forward-market Target Modelmentioning

confidence: 93%

Why (and how) to regulate power exchanges in the EU market integration context?

Meeus¹

2011

Energy Policy

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“…Table 1 The Accounted for 87% of overall carbon emissions, Beijing's construction and electricity carbon emission was much higher than 24% in Sao Paulo and 77% in New York [11]. The national building energy consumption data in 2006 [12] which was announced by the Ministry of Construction, indicated that public building in towns was the largest energy consumption per unit area in all types as shown in Economics Table 2.…”

Section: Public Building Energy Consumption and Its Carbon Emissions ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluation Method on Energy Consumption and Carbon Emission for Public Building

Liu

Liang

et al. 2014

AMM

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According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calculations, the architecture industry totally consumed 40% of the energy and 36% of CO2 emissions in world. The large public building with rapid floor area growth, high-energy consumption and huge potential for energy saving features, is a key area of energy conservation obviously. This paper researched the trend of low-carbon building construction and high building energy efficiency, the public building energy consumption and its carbon emissions effect. Moreover, consumption and carbon emission of different types of public building energy was analyzed. Estimation methods on public building energy consumption and carbon emission were summarized in the last part.

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“…This limits liquidity and makes it challenging to decide bids (Siddiqui et al, 2005). One remedy is to limit the trades that can be made, e.g., by aggregating nodes to zones, but this breaks the FTR’s property as a perfect hedge (Benjamin, 2010). Additional opportunities for error arise because simultaneous feasibility tests performed in FTR auctions typically assume a known grid configuration, while the actual status of the grid is uncertain (Kristiansen, 2007; Deng et al, 2010; Alderete, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Congestion Risk, Transmission Rights, and Investment Equilibria in Electricity Markets

Risanger¹,

Mays²

2024

The Energy Journal

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Financial instruments that help provide revenue certainty are fundamental for project finance in liberalized electricity markets. Improved management of locational risk caused by network congestion is becoming increasingly important with a growing share of production from geographically remote renewable resources. Nodal markets have financial transmission rights (FTRs) to enable participants to manage locational risk, but there is no evidence that FTRs have been used to support project finance. Through a stochastic equilibrium model in which market participants invest in production assets and trade risk, we show that long-term FTRs promote surplus-maximizing generation investments and reduce the cost of capital. Investors pair them with energy price hedges and thus protect themselves against both types of risk. Our results suggest that altering the definition and allocation of FTRs to match the needs of project finance, e.g., by enabling new generators to procure a long-term right at the time of interconnection, could help ensure a complete risk market and encourage efficient investments.

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A further inquiry into FTR properties

Cited by 9 publications

References 32 publications

Why (and how) to regulate power exchanges in the EU market integration context?

Why (and how) to regulate power exchanges in the EU market integration context?

Evaluation Method on Energy Consumption and Carbon Emission for Public Building

Congestion Risk, Transmission Rights, and Investment Equilibria in Electricity Markets

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