A Fresh Look at ‘Relational’ Values in Nature: Distinctions Derived from the Debate on Meaningfulness in Life

Abstract

<jats:p>Some recent policy-oriented publications have put forward a third category of environmental values, namely relational or eudaimonic values, in addition to intrinsic and instrumental values. In this debate, there is, however, much confusion about the content of such values. This paper looks at a fundamental debate in ethics about a third category of reasons besides reasons from morality and self-interest, labelled as reasons of love, care or meaningfulness. This category allows us, first, to see the relation between relational and eudaimonic values, and, second, to make clear and applicable distinctions between the relational valuing of nature and moral or instrumental valuing.</jats:p>

Intrinsic values and the life framework of values: why we should go back to basics—comment to O’Connor and Kenter (2019)

“…(…) The social and cultural dimension has also a more local aspect, for example in the importance that local communities place on the "ordinary places" in or near which they live.' This seems close to conceptualisations of relational value in recent environmental philosophy (Hourdequin and Wong 2005;Muraca 2016;Neuteleers 2020) and as promoted in recent IPBES papers.…”

“…Unsurprisingly, this is also what they then find as the outcome of their empirical research: 'the results displayed a strong co-emergence of articulated intrinsic and relational values. This reflects that participants may observe objective evaluative properties of non-human entities without reference to people, and, at the same time, relate to these entities more subjectively, giving expression to their own feelings and experiences' (O'Connor andKenter 2019, p. 1260). This is hardly a surprise, since for them, those two ways of valuing are conceptually two sides of the same coin, namely value and the experience of value.…”

“…This is hardly a surprise, since for them, those two ways of valuing are conceptually two sides of the same coin, namely value and the experience of value. Their struggle with relational values also reappears in a rather literal reading of O'Neill et al's second category of 'living in' nature: being amidst 'a flock of gannets diving', 'through a pod of dolphins', 'being in the sea', and 'paddle boarding with porpoises in the surf with us' (O'Connor andKenter 2019, pp. 1258, our italicization).…”

“…One better allows for a broader category, one closer to moral attitudes. In the authors' own words: 'The intrinsic value of nature in the broadest sense involves the importance of non-or more-then-human entities as an end in itself, rather than as a human end' (O'Connor andKenter 2019, p. 1250). Also in the case of relational values, it seems advisable to stay closer to established interpretations of relational value, such as in the IPBES framework or in O'Neill's framework.…”

Experiencing Values in the Flow of Events: A Phenomenological Approach to Relational Values

“…Thus, unless we manage to give a more precise definition of relational values, there is no reason to believe this concept has any greater theoretical and practical relevance. In fact, as Neuteleers (2020) has noted, its success might primarily be due to its vagueness. Anyone can use it and link his or her research to it in one way or another.…”