2020 IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC) 2020
DOI: 10.1109/vnc51378.2020.9318334
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A Formal Security Assessment Framework for Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control

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Cited by 7 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…However, V2V communication loss is widespread in practical applications. The causing reasons could be hacking, malfunctioning communications equipment, or jammers [21]. This section will analyze how the distributed control algorithm based on the spring damping energy model can resist V2V communication loss.…”
Section: Robustness To V2v Communication Lossmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, V2V communication loss is widespread in practical applications. The causing reasons could be hacking, malfunctioning communications equipment, or jammers [21]. This section will analyze how the distributed control algorithm based on the spring damping energy model can resist V2V communication loss.…”
Section: Robustness To V2v Communication Lossmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…CACC is a framework that relies heavily on the V2V communication. If the V2V communication is attacked or lost, CACC will degrade to ACC, thus increasing the risk of vehicle collisions [21]- [24]. Numerous experimental results have shown that ACC has a negative impact on the traction energy consumption of the vehicle [25], [26].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Formal methods and tools have been used for verifying the safety (Kamali et al 2017;Mason et al 2017;Mitra 2021;Moradi et al 2020;Sha et al 2009) and security (Dantas et al 2020) of CPS. While some works investigate the effect of faults (or attacks) on some aspects, such as communication delays, they do not propose systematic means to identify causes for deviations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our work is intended for use during early stages of design and development. During this phase, the mission that the CPS has to perform is specified, e.g., visit some points (Mason et al 2017), or be able to autonomously follow vehicles ahead (Dantas et al 2020;Moradi et al 2020). Moreover, high level requirements are developed, e.g., the number of CPS agents required, their energy resources, etc.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The system interconnectivity brings security to the development life cycle of safety-critical systems, as an intruder might cause catastrophic events by remotely disabling safety functions. Intruders can attack such communication channels to infiltrate vehicles and, e.g., disable safety functions thus reducing passenger safety [31] or even causing accidents [7].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%