A formal analysis of authentication protocols for mobile devices in next generation networks

Abstract

Summary Next Generation Networks comprise a wide variety of access technologies such as 2G/3G, WLAN as well as the Long‐Term Evolution (LTE) networks. In this environment, mobile devices are expected to store sensitive data and represent users to access the underlying networks and connect to a wide variety of sensitive servers. It is crucial, in this sense, for end users to trust their mobile devices and for all transactions using them to be secure. Therefore, a number of communication frameworks in Next Generation Networks have been working on designing device authentication protocols that achieve mutual authentication between users and mobile terminals. This paper analyses some of these protocols and introduces two new device authentication protocols, verifies them using formal methods approach and discusses how they achieved desired security proprieties. The performance analysis highlights another advantage of the proposed protocols. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A Formally Verified Access Control Mechanism for Information Centric Networks

“…It also involves a capability-based access control mechanism (Gollmann, 2011) (Chen, 2014) to enforce authorized access to data objects. However, unlike the AKA protocol, the access control of (M. Aiash, 2014) has not been formally verified neither critically analysed. Therefore, this paper considers the security mechanisms in (M. Aiash, 2014), and supported by formal methods approach, we discover a security vulnerability in the proposed access control and introduce an enhancement.…”

“…However, unlike the AKA protocol, the access control of (M. Aiash, 2014) has not been formally verified neither critically analysed. Therefore, this paper considers the security mechanisms in (M. Aiash, 2014), and supported by formal methods approach, we discover a security vulnerability in the proposed access control and introduce an enhancement. The enhancement is formally verified using formal methods approach based on Casper/FDR tool.…”

“…In NetInf architecture, security measures are defined as part of the URI-ni naming scheme (H. Baker, 2012) to guarantee the data integrity, confidentiality and data source authenticity. As described in (M. Aiash, 2014), security in NetInf focuses mainly on the security of data objects while less interest is focused on the security of the infrastructure, network elements and communication channels. Consequently, the NetInf architecture is still vulnerable to security attacks (M. Aiash, 2014) in form of data poisoning in the NSR and Denial of Service (DoS).…”

“…As described in (M. Aiash, 2014), security in NetInf focuses mainly on the security of data objects while less interest is focused on the security of the infrastructure, network elements and communication channels. Consequently, the NetInf architecture is still vulnerable to security attacks (M. Aiash, 2014) in form of data poisoning in the NSR and Denial of Service (DoS). Therefore, the work in (M. Aiash, 2014) proposed a Registration Stage to take place prior to the Publication Stage.…”

“…Consequently, the NetInf architecture is still vulnerable to security attacks (M. Aiash, 2014) in form of data poisoning in the NSR and Denial of Service (DoS). Therefore, the work in (M. Aiash, 2014) proposed a Registration Stage to take place prior to the Publication Stage. The Registration Stage involves a new Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol based on the ID-Based Cryptography (IBC) (Shamir, 1985).…”