A disease transmission inspired closed-loop supply chain dynamic model for product collection

Fu, Lingxian; Tang, Jie; Meng, Fanyong

doi:10.1016/j.tre.2021.102363

Cited by 16 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…For example, Li et al [11] investigated the effects of subsidy policy and dual credit policy on the production strategies of NEV supply chain and CV supply chain from a cross-chain perspective, their findings showed that the implementation of dual credit policy boosted the profits of NEV supply chain while reducing CV supply chain and total profits, and also emphasized that subsidies only increased the profits of NEV supply chain temporarily. Fu et al [8] constructed a dynamic closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model consisting of NEV manufacturers and retailers from a reverse channel perspective, analyzed the decisions and profits of the supply chain members. Mohammadzadeh et al [27] examined the optimal pricing decisions in a two-stage EV supply chain with a total cost of ownership (TCO) view.…”

Section: Supply Chain Management In Nevmentioning

confidence: 99%

Operation strategy for new energy vehicle enterprises based on dual credit policy

Chun

Wang

et al. 2023

JIMO

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<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This article constructs a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (producing both fuel vehicles (FV) and new energy vehicles) and a retailer (selling both fuel vehicles and new energy vehicles) based on dual credit policy, considers three different power structure models, including the vertical Nash game model, the manufacturer Stackelberg game model, the retailer Stackelberg game model, and explores the operational strategy issues of new energy vehicle (NEV) enterprises under the dual credit policy. By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions under different channel power structures, our findings indicate that (1) When the demand function is linear, the vertical Nash game model can achieve the highest system profit of the automotive supply chain, and in the manufacturer Stackelberg game model, the profit of the automaker is higher than that of the retailer, while in the retailer Stackelberg game model, the profit of the automaker is lower than that of the retailer. (2) The demand and pricing for FV and NEV in different models are determined by the range of FV and NEV production costs, credit trading prices, and the proportion of NEV credits. (3) Both the increase in the credit trading prices and the proportion of NEV credits will promote increased profits for the manufacturer and retailer. (4) The increase of the price sensitivity coefficient will reduce the demand as well as the profit of auto supply chain members.</p>

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Section: Supply Chain Management In Nevmentioning

confidence: 99%

Operation strategy for new energy vehicle enterprises based on dual credit policy

Chun

Wang

et al. 2023

JIMO

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“…Furthermore, some scholars developed research based on various perspectives. For example, Fu et al (2021) analyzed the decisions and profits of NEV manufacturers and retailers in a dynamic closed‐loop supply chain from a reverse channel perspective. Mohammadzadeh et al (2021) studied the optimal pricing strategy for a two‐level EV supply chain from a total cost of ownership perspective.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The optimal decision for automobile enterprises considering shareholding strategies and dual‐credit policy

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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This article develops a new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer, considers the incentive effect of the dual‐credit policy, proposes three shareholding strategies (manufacturer shareholding, retailer shareholding, and cross‐shareholding), and investigates the optimal decisions of NEV enterprises. Our results indicate that increased credit trading price, manufacturer shareholding ratio, and retailer shareholding ratio all improve NEV low‐carbon levels and manufacturer profits. In contrast, the performance of retailer profits is more complex and requires a lower range of shareholding ratio in most situations to achieve growth. Meanwhile, the cross‐shareholding strategy is the optimal choice for the manufacturer. However, the retailer only sometimes benefits from a cross‐shareholding strategy, and the manufacturer shareholding strategy can lead to the highest retailer profits in most cases. Furthermore, these findings can provide critical managerial insights for automobile enterprises and governments.

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“…Liu et al [ 22 ] studied a dual-channel CLSC network optimization problem considering the net present value of the network, carbon emissions, and social sustainability indicators. Fu et al [ 23 ] used statistics of new energy vehicles in China to study reverse channel problems in dynamic CLSC systems to provide suggestions for the selection of reverse channels. Fu et al [ 24 ] proposed an equilibrium model of a coupled CLSC network, namely the forward and reverse supply chain network, to analyze the interactions between these two networks.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remanufacturing Strategy Choice of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Considering Carbon Emission Trading, Green Innovation, and Green Consumers

Zhou

Lin

Fan

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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Due to increasingly serious environmental pollution problems and governments’ strengthening of environmental impact supervision, manufacturing companies are seeking green production methods, implementing carbon trading systems, and promoting the trend towards green remanufacturing. Thus, this paper introduces green factors to the existing closed-loop supply chain network models and studies the impact of carbon trading, green innovation efforts, and green consumers on the choice between two remanufacturing strategies: an in-house remanufacturing strategy and an authorized remanufacturing strategy. The results concerning the choice of the remanufacturing strategy are as follows: from the perspective of obtaining more profits, when the carbon trading price is low, the companies choose the authorized remanufacturing strategy; when the carbon trading price is high, the companies choose to remanufacture by themselves. For all the green innovation efforts and the proportions of green consumers, when the recovery rate of the used product is low, the companies choose to remanufacture by themselves; when the recovery rate of the used product is high, the companies choose the authorized remanufacturing strategy.

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A disease transmission inspired closed-loop supply chain dynamic model for product collection

Cited by 16 publications

References 49 publications

Operation strategy for new energy vehicle enterprises based on dual credit policy

Operation strategy for new energy vehicle enterprises based on dual credit policy

The optimal decision for automobile enterprises considering shareholding strategies and dual‐credit policy

Remanufacturing Strategy Choice of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Considering Carbon Emission Trading, Green Innovation, and Green Consumers

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