Operation strategy for new energy vehicle enterprises based on dual credit policy

Abstract

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This article constructs a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (producing both fuel vehicles (FV) and new energy vehicles) and a retailer (selling both fuel vehicles and new energy vehicles) based on dual credit policy, considers three different power structure models, including the vertical Nash game model, the manufacturer Stackelberg game model, the retailer Stackelberg game model, and explores the operational strategy issues of new energy vehicle (NEV) enterprises under the dual credit policy. By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions under different channel power structures, our findings indicate that (1) When the demand function is linear, the vertical Nash game model can achieve the highest system profit of the automotive supply chain, and in the manufacturer Stackelberg game model, the profit of the automaker is higher than that of the retailer, while in the retailer Stackelberg game model, the profit of the automaker is lower than that of the retailer. (2) The demand and pricing for FV and NEV in different models are determined by the range of FV and NEV production costs, credit trading prices, and the proportion of NEV credits. (3) Both the increase in the credit trading prices and the proportion of NEV credits will promote increased profits for the manufacturer and retailer. (4) The increase of the price sensitivity coefficient will reduce the demand as well as the profit of auto supply chain members.</p>

Fast or stable: Research on dynamic behaviors of duopoly automakers under the background of energy transformation in the automobile industry

“…In addition, some studies have also investigated the impact of dual credit policy on production decisions of automakers from the micro level [ [13] , [14] , [15] ], fuel economy of ICEVs [ 16 ], electrification transformation of traditional automakers [ 17 ], R&D investment of the driving range for NEV manufactures [ 18 ], and the production and pricing decisions, of two types of automakers [ 19 ] were discussed respectively. Pu et al [ 20 ] discussed the business strategy of EV manufactures under the dual credit policy. Jin et al [ 21 ] developed split strategy and integrative development strategy's optimal decision models under the dual credit policy, and addressed which scenario was more advantageous and effective.…”

The optimal decision for automobile enterprises considering shareholding strategies and dual‐credit policy

“…Also, they suggested that the hybrid strategy can enable CV‐NEV companies to maximize their profits. Pu et al (2023) applied three different power structures to explore the operational strategy of NEV enterprises under the dual‐credit policy. They found that the vertical Nash game allowed the automotive supply chain to achieve the highest system profit.…”

Factors and evaluation models for the development of new energy electric vehicles in China

“…China, as one of the world's largest automobile markets, also faces severe environmental and energy challenges. To address these challenges, the Chinese government has actively promoted the development of new energy electric vehicles (NEEVs) to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and improve air quality [1,2].…”