A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition

Demos, Raphael

doi:10.5840/philinquiry2016403/423

Cited by 11 publications

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“…Russell's endorsement of negative facts during a conference at Harvard allegedly (almost) sparked off a riot (Russell 1918: 211). Negative entities have been described as mysterious (Molnar 2000), not causally efficient (Molnar 2000;Dowe 2001), non-perceivable 14 in a direct or non-inferential way (Demos 1917;Molnar 2000), non-physical and, generally speaking, mind-dependent. 15 Armstrong's view has been criticized both as implicitly admitting negative states of affairs as well as on its own merits (Molnar 2000;Kukso 2006;Jago 2013).…”

Section: Rejection Of Thesis (Iv)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Positive truthmakers for negative truths: a solution to Molnar’s problem

Waechter

2016

Philos Stud

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The present paper addresses Molnar's problem (Australas J Philos 78(1): [72][73][74][75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82][83][84][85][86] 2000): that of finding positive truthmakers for negative truths. The proposed solution, called (Simple), is to hold truth and falsity to be primitive and positive features of propositions and to take every literal negative truth to be made true by the falsity of the atomic proposition that it embeds. The solution is shown to be compatible with Maximalism, Necessitarianism and with the Entailment Thesis, as well as with most if not all possible variants of truthmaking theory. Other advantages of (Simple) are noted: it doesn't require the inclusion of exotic objects in one's ontology; it doesn't require any revision of one's logic or of one's theory of modality. The solution also allows one to eschew negative facts, tropes and properties while providing a definition of negativity (DefNegativity) for certain literal propositions. The paper ends by rebutting several objections that may be levelled against (Simple).

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Section: Rejection Of Thesis (Iv)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Positive truthmakers for negative truths: a solution to Molnar’s problem

Waechter

2016

Philos Stud

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“…What makes Demos' article relevant in the context of this discussion on Tractarian negation, its commitment to an image of a formal, neutral, combinatorial and truth‐functional logic, and, therefore, its inability to express ascriptions of degrees to empirical qualities is the very announcement of his goal to discover “the form of negative proposition” (Demos : 188). The idea of a general negation form to be pursued or discovered for simply not being visible in non‐analysed everyday sentences must be highlighted here.…”

Section: Demos' Denial: Negation Reducible To Some Positive Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Demos does not develop the idea of a negative proposition being related to all other propositions, but he suggests it in the beginning of his paper. Demos states that he is aiming at discovering the relation between negative propositions and the “total field of propositions” (Demos : 188). In this way, Wittgenstein's solution in his return to Philosophy in 1929, as well as Demos' view of denial, both suggest a radical type of semantic holism; to understand a proposition means to understand the system of oppositions, exclusions and implications in which the proposition is necessarily inserted.…”

Section: Demos' Denial: Negation Reducible To Some Positive Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some logical “parts” of the analysed proposition do not have to do with the words we use in ordinary expressions, as shown, for instance, by the author's seminal treatment of quantifications. In this sense, Demos maintains that “the parallelism in the further treatment on the one hand of simple phrases by Mr. Russell, and on the other of negative propositions by myself, such that the former are supplemented by an assertion of existence, and the latter by an assertion of truth, is obvious” (Demos : 195).…”

Section: Demos' Denial: Negation Reducible To Some Positive Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Two Forms of Exclusion Mean Two Different Negations

Silva

2014

Philosophical Investigations

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Para o meu professor Luiz Carlos PereiraHere, the logical behaviour of negation in Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1918) is compared with Demos' account of denial (1917). Even if we hold negation as a pure syntactical device, at least in some context, it brings a handful of complex semantic information -potentially an infinite amount (e.g., in the ascription of degrees to empirical qualities or of colours to visual points). We advocate then the existence of at least two negations due to the existence of two different and non-reducible types of exclusion. The first negation is a Tractarian and classical one, based on the notion of contradiction, whereas the second is a non-classical negation, based on the notion of contrariety.

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“…Mellor's strategy is similar to Demos's (1917), to which Russell is responding (1918: p. 211-214). The question Russell presses on Demos is: how should we interpret 'not-p'?…”

Section: T2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Aboutness and negative truths: a modest strategy for truthmaker theorists

Schipper

2017

Synthese

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A central problem for any truthmaker theory is the problem of negative truths (P-NEG). In this paper, I develop a novel, piecemeal strategy for solving this problem. The strategy puts central focus on a truth-relevant notion of aboutness within a metaphysically modest version of truthmaker theory and uses key conceptual tools gained by taking a deeper look at the best attempts to solve the problem of intentionality. I begin this task by critically discussing past proposed solutions to P-NEG in light of Russell's debate with Demos. This reveals a central difficulty with addressing the problem, specifically that one cannot be committed to incompatibility facts in one's account of negation and of the truth of negative truths. I then present an aboutnessbased version of truthmaker theory. Utilising what I call the strict and full account of aboutness, I extract aboutness-based theories of truth and falsity. I use this machinery to present a promising new strategy for solving P-NEG which does not have the problems of alternative approaches. Finally, I present and respond to some potential objections.

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A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Positive truthmakers for negative truths: a solution to Molnar’s problem

Positive truthmakers for negative truths: a solution to Molnar’s problem

Two Forms of Exclusion Mean Two Different Negations

Aboutness and negative truths: a modest strategy for truthmaker theorists

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