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OF THE PAPERMany commentators have supposed that when Kant speaks of the claim of judgments of taste to subjective universal validity, he means a claim about how people will or would respond to a given object under certain conditions. Others have held that he has in mind a claim, to be justified by the connection of taste with morality, that people should respond to the object in a certain way. I argue, against both interpretations, that Kant understands the universality claim in judgments of taste to be a normative requirement shared with ordinary empirical judgments, and therefore one to be justified by epistemological considerations alone, without any reference to morality. This, however, raises a problem: why should the universal agreement required by a judgment of taste consist in the sharing of a feeling, rather than simply in the sharing of a thought? Kant's answer is that in a judgment of taste, a feeling assumes the role of predicate. But such a solution, I observe in conclusion, presents a problem as serious as the one it purports to solve.2M ILES RIND 2. Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). All citations for Guyer, unless otherwise indicated, are to this book. Incidentally, the sense in which I, following Guyer, employ the phrase "claim of taste" is not the sense in which Kant himself, in one place, uses it. What he refers to as "the claims and counterclaims of taste [den Ansprüchen und Gegenansprüchen des Geschmacks]" ( § 57, 5:341) are not judgments of taste, but judgments of reason as to the nature of taste. See § 55, 5:337 and § 57 Rem. II, 5:344.
OF THE PAPERMany commentators have supposed that when Kant speaks of the claim of judgments of taste to subjective universal validity, he means a claim about how people will or would respond to a given object under certain conditions. Others have held that he has in mind a claim, to be justified by the connection of taste with morality, that people should respond to the object in a certain way. I argue, against both interpretations, that Kant understands the universality claim in judgments of taste to be a normative requirement shared with ordinary empirical judgments, and therefore one to be justified by epistemological considerations alone, without any reference to morality. This, however, raises a problem: why should the universal agreement required by a judgment of taste consist in the sharing of a feeling, rather than simply in the sharing of a thought? Kant's answer is that in a judgment of taste, a feeling assumes the role of predicate. But such a solution, I observe in conclusion, presents a problem as serious as the one it purports to solve.2M ILES RIND 2. Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). All citations for Guyer, unless otherwise indicated, are to this book. Incidentally, the sense in which I, following Guyer, employ the phrase "claim of taste" is not the sense in which Kant himself, in one place, uses it. What he refers to as "the claims and counterclaims of taste [den Ansprüchen und Gegenansprüchen des Geschmacks]" ( § 57, 5:341) are not judgments of taste, but judgments of reason as to the nature of taste. See § 55, 5:337 and § 57 Rem. II, 5:344.
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