A developmental intergroup theory of social stereotypes and prejudice

Bigler, Rebecca S.; Liben, Lynn S.

doi:10.1016/s0065-2407(06)80004-2

Cited by 586 publications

(1,001 citation statements)

References 103 publications

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“…To determine whether this mechanism accounts for crosscultural variation in social essentialism, future work will need to test whether the effects obtained in the populations studied here (which consisted primarily of educated middle-class families in a diverse, urban environment) extend to other cultural communities. Certainly other cultural factors-for example, the degree to which a category serves as the basis of segregation or differential treatment (20,22,37)-could also play roles in shaping the development of social essentialism.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural transmission of social essentialism

Rhodes

Leslie

Tworek

2012

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

306

405

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Social essentialism entails the belief that certain social categories (e.g., gender, race) mark fundamentally distinct kinds of people. Essentialist beliefs have pernicious consequences, supporting social stereotyping and contributing to prejudice. How does social essentialism develop? In the studies reported here, we tested the hypothesis that generic language facilitates the cultural transmission of social essentialism. Two studies found that hearing generic language about a novel social category diverse for race, ethnicity, age, and sex led 4-y-olds and adults to develop essentialist beliefs about that social category. A third study documented that experimentally inducing parents to hold essentialist beliefs about a novel social category led them to produce more generic language when discussing the category with their children. Thus, generic language facilitates the transmission of essentialist beliefs about social categories from parents to children.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural transmission of social essentialism

Rhodes

Leslie

Tworek

2012

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

306

405

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“…Implicit pro-White bias occurs among children as young as 3 years old throughout the world. [12][13][14][15] In a study of children and adults, Baron et al found that explicit beliefs about race became more egalitarian with age, but implicit race bias remained unchanged. 15 Implicit and explicit beliefs about other characteristics, like age and gender, may follow similar patterns.…”

Section: Origins Of Implicit Biasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physicians and Implicit Bias: How Doctors May Unwittingly Perpetuate Health Care Disparities

2013

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“…An interesting question is whether schoolaged children would still show the effect we found in the current study if cultural and psychological distances were reduced, for instance, if the antinormative party were an outgroup member who had different values (Sarkissian et al, 2011) or an ingroup member who had dramatically different preferences, beliefs, and values. Moreover, it could be that children's valenced attitudes toward another group modulate their tendency to express relativism; for instance, social categorization, biased (essentialist) beliefs, experimentally induced negative attitudes, or prejudice against other groups (Aboud, 2003;Bigler & Liben, 2006;Dunham et al, 2011;Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002;Rhodes & Chalik, 2013;Rottman & Kelemen, 2012;Rutland, Cameron, Bennett, & Ferrell, 2005) may be related to stronger moral objectivism. Thus, future work may investigate whether children's attitudes toward other groups play a role in, or are orthogonal to, their metaethical judgments.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Children’s developing metaethical judgments

Schmidt

Gonzalez-Cabrera

Tomasello

2017

Journal of Experimental Child Psychology

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a b s t r a c tHuman adults incline toward moral objectivism but may approach things more relativistically if different cultures are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children (N = 136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it is okay to do X). We assessed children's metaethical judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party (objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could be right. We found that 9-year-olds, but not younger children, were more likely to judge that both parties could be right when a normative ingroup judge disagreed with an antinormative extraterrestrial judge (with different preferences and background) than when the antinormative judge was another ingroup individual. This effect was not found in a comparison case where parties disagreed about the possibility of different physical laws. These findings suggest that although young children often exhibit moral objectivism, by early school age they begin to temper their objectivism with culturally relative metaethical judgments.Ó 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. IntroductionChildren are born into a world full of human-made laws (e.g., moral or conventional norms) and natural laws (e.g., gravity) and start to make sense of them descriptively during infancy http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.07.008 0022-0965/Ó 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. ⇑ Corresponding author.E-mail address: marco.schmidt@psy.lmu.de (M. F. H. Schmidt). Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 164 (2017) 163-177 Contents lists available at ScienceDirectJournal of Experimental Child Psychology jo urnal homepage: www.elsevier.co m/locate/jecp (Baillargeon, Li, Gertner, & Wu, 2011;Dahl & Tran, 2016;Diesendruck & Markson, 2011;Hamlin, 2013;Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). During early childhood, children proactively infer, construct, and reason about human-made norms (Göckeritz, Schmidt, & Tomasello, 2014;Kalish, 1998;Killen & Smetana, 2015;Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016;Schmidt, Rakoczy, Mietzsch, & Tomasello, 2016;Turiel, 1983). And regarding prototypical moral norms (e.g., pertaining to the welfare of agents), research suggests that preschoolers apply these rather universally, treat them as unchangeable entities, and regard moral violations as more severe than conventional transgressions (Dahl & Kim, 2014;Killen & Smetana, 2015;Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012;Turiel, 1983;Turiel & Dahl, 2016). These early normative attitudes toward others' actions, however, pertain to first-order normative judgments-that is, judging actions and intentions as right or wrong according to a certain standard or norm (Schmidt & Rakoczy, in press). In the current study, we investigated children's developing capacity to make judgments about such first-order judgments (e.g., ''Xing is wrong!") in contexts of disagreement, that is, second-order judgments about whether only one person or two persons can be right about an issue on ...

show abstract

A developmental intergroup theory of social stereotypes and prejudice

Cited by 586 publications

References 103 publications

Cultural transmission of social essentialism

Cultural transmission of social essentialism

Physicians and Implicit Bias: How Doctors May Unwittingly Perpetuate Health Care Disparities

Children’s developing metaethical judgments

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