2020
DOI: 10.1080/02331934.2020.1786088
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A decomposition algorithm for Nash equilibria in intersection management

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Cited by 7 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 18 publications
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“…These conditions have been partially exploited, in combination with additional assumptions on the dynamics and the payoffs, to obtain scenarios in which it is easier to prove existence of NE and to find them. For example [20] makes convexity assumptions about the bestresponse sets and how the control signal parametrizes the dynamics, while [21] obtains similar results when paths are fixed and the vehicles control only the acceleration.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…These conditions have been partially exploited, in combination with additional assumptions on the dynamics and the payoffs, to obtain scenarios in which it is easier to prove existence of NE and to find them. For example [20] makes convexity assumptions about the bestresponse sets and how the control signal parametrizes the dynamics, while [21] obtains similar results when paths are fixed and the vehicles control only the acceleration.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…This kind of Nash equilibrium is particularly suited for socially aware motion planning as for such an equilibrium the Lagrange multipliers associated with the shared constraints are equal among all players, which introduces some notion of fairness among the players. This idea has been used in various recent papers on traffic control, i.e., without human drivers, such as [12], [13], where ellipsoidal constraints are used to enforce safety. As ellipsoidal overapproximations seem less suitable to model human behavior and may furthermore be conservative in small distances (where interaction is more pronounced), we instead extend the collision avoidance formulation of [14], which involves no approximation of rectangular obstacles.…”
Section: A Background and Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(13d) The main idea behind the parameter estimation procedure is to select parameter values θ := (θ i ) i∈H , such that the observed behavior approximately matches the optimality conditions (13). This naturally leads to the following parameter estimation procedure: Given the current estimate θt for the parameters, set the updated parameters θt+1 as the solution of minimize θ, u, y ∇ u L Σ (u, y; θ)…”
Section: Online Learning Of Parametersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, in an emergency such as after a collision, interacting vehicles have to be explicitly cooperative to stabilise themselves on the road and protect their safety as well as others [21]. Platooning under Nash optimality [22], intersection management with generalised Nash equilibrium [23], and lane‐change via non‐cooperative game theory [24] are some of the CAVs problems solved by applying non‐cooperative games. In this paper, we propose a differential game‐based platoon control scheme under the framework of non‐cooperative differential games.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%