A comprehensive study of multiple deductions-based algebraic trace driven cache attacks on AES

Zhao, Xinjie; Guo, Shize; Zhang, Fan; Wang, Tao; Shi, Zhijie; Liu, Zhe; Gallais, Jean-François

doi:10.1016/j.cose.2013.07.002

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(100 reference statements)

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“…At the end of two rounds, it can be seen that all byte differences becomes active, on which no further analysis is possible. Suppose, the 4 th round output has passive byte difference in any of the following byte positions: (1,8,11,14), (2,5,12,15), (3,6,9,16), or (4,7,10,13). Such a differential when decrypted two rounds will have 4 passive bytes differentials.…”

Section: Four Round Impossible Differentialmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

New Results in Reduced Round AES - 256 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

Jithendra¹,

Shahana²,

Lacy³

2020

IJCDS

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Section: Four Round Impossible Differentialmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An improved version of this attack is proposed in [10]. Cache attacks and collision attacks are illustrated in [11] and [12] respectively. Enhancement of AES security against modern attacks using variable key block ciphers are is given in [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Results in Reduced Round AES - 256 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

Jithendra¹,

Shahana²,

Lacy³

2020

IJCDS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Biased keys are able to reveal the pseudorandomness of the approach and the key is deduced further by applying differential methods or fault injection as shown before. Multiple deductions-based algebraic trace driven cache attack on AES has been shown in [22]. The behaviour of the cache reveals the input whole or partially.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

RK-AES: An Improved Version of AES Using a New Key Generation Process with Random Keys

Saha

Geetha

Kumar

et al. 2018

Security and Communication Networks

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Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a standard algorithm for block ciphers for providing security services. A number of variations of this algorithm are available in network security domain. In spite of the strong security features, this algorithm has been recently broken down by the cryptanalysis processes. Therefore, it is required to improve the security strength of this algorithm as AES is popular in commercial use. In this paper, we have shown the reasons of the loopholes in AES and also have provided a solution by using our Symmetric Random Function Generator (SRFG). The use of randomness in the key generation process in block cipher is novel in this domain. We have also compared our results with the original AES based upon some parameters such as nonlinearity, resiliency, balancedness, propagation characteristics, and immunity. The results show that our proposed version of AES is better in withstanding attacks.

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Analysis on the parameter selection method for FLUSH+RELOAD based cache timing attack on RSA

Ping

Wang

et al. 2015

China Commun.

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33 cal information such as time, sound, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation etc. leaked from the hardware platform during encryption and decryption to reveal the internal states of the algorithm, thus the knowledge of key can be inferred.Cache timing attacks [3] are one category of side channel attacks. The time difference between Cache access and non-Cache access are considered as the leakage source. Typically, a spy process can be used to set the Cache to a known state and monitor the change of the state to gather the information on the Cache accesses of victim process. Since the proposal of Cache timing attack, it has been used to break various public-key cryptography and block cipher, such as RSA [4], DSA [6], El-Gamal [14], AES [7][15][16][17].Existing Cache timing attacks on RSA are divided into two categories. The first category is based on monitoring the specific instructions [5] [8]. The dummy instructions of the spy process precisely maps to the same L1 Cache location with the specific instructions of victim process. In this way, the adversary creates a conflict between dummy instructions and the specific instructions. Therefore, the execution of the specific instructions by the victim can be detected. The other category is based on monitoring the entire L1 Cache [4] [6]. The adversary can fill the entire L1 Cache with Abstract: FLUSH+RELOAD attack is recently proposed as a new type of Cache timing attacks. There are three essential factors in this attack, which are monitored instructions, threshold and waiting interval. However, existing literature seldom exploit how and why they could affect the system. This paper aims to study the impacts of these three parameters, and the method of how to choose optimal values. The complete rules for choosing the monitored instructions based on necessary and sufficient condition are proposed. How to select the optimal threshold based on Bayesian binary signal detection principal is also proposed. Meanwhile, the time sequence model of monitoring is constructed and the calculation of the optimal waiting interval is specified. Extensive experiments are conducted on RSA implemented with binary square-and-multiply algorithm. The results show that the average success rate of full RSA key recovery is 89.67%.

show abstract

A comprehensive study of multiple deductions-based algebraic trace driven cache attacks on AES

Cited by 4 publications

References 17 publications

New Results in Reduced Round AES - 256 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

New Results in Reduced Round AES - 256 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

RK-AES: An Improved Version of AES Using a New Key Generation Process with Random Keys

Analysis on the parameter selection method for FLUSH+RELOAD based cache timing attack on RSA

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