A Comparison of the Director Networks of the Main Listed Companies in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States

Santella, Paolo; Drago, Carlo; Polo, Andrea; Gagliardi, Enrico

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1437087

Cited by 31 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…[50]). Second, despite some specificities, Italy is somewhat representative of the complex tangling up of interests which also characterizes other European countries like Germany, France and Belgium (see, for, instance [52] for a cross-country comparison of director networks). Finally, Italy has the advantage of being the European country with the lowest threshold for disclosure of ownership in a listed company: whoever comes to possess directly or indirectly more than 2% of the voting capital of a listed company has to send a filing to Consob (the Italian SEC) which in turn makes it available to the public.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communities in Italian corporate networks

Piccardi

Calatroni

Bertoni

2010

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communities in Italian corporate networks

Piccardi

Calatroni

Bertoni

2010

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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“…What comparative surveys point out is that the Anglo-American system of governance shows the lowest proportion of multiple directors and the lowest accumulation of positions (Santella et al 2009 As Windolf (2002) shows the differences between corporate networks in Europe (Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK) and the United States depend mainly on the influence of legislation.…”

Section: The Interlocking Network Directoratesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Positive Freedom in Networked Capitalism: An Empirical Analysis

Carbonai

Drago

2015

SSRN Journal

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The article proposes a social network analysis of the main European capitalisms and its correspondence with an index of economic freedom. The analysis relates to two kinds of economic liberties taken from the concept of freedom formulated by Isaiah Berlin. While the first kind of freedom (negative freedom) depends on the external system (e.g. the constraints on the firm defined by the regulations), the second refers to the internal obligations within the business system itself that prevent the free exercise of business (positive freedom): specifically, the social network, in which the company is embedded. After an operationalization of the two concepts of freedom, the analysis of a comprehensive database allows us to explore the relationship between the two kinds of freedom.

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“…The issue of interlocking directorships has been a matter of concern and an area of study for many years and it continues to be an area of close scrutiny, as high levels of interlocks exist in the boards of the top companies across the most significant stock exchanges globally (Santella, Drago, Polo, & Gagliardi, 2008). In 1914, the Clayton Act in the United States (US) prohibited interlocking directorates among competing corporations (Dooley, 1969).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although research into director interlocks in stock exchanges around the world has been performed since the 1930s, there is little information concerning director interlocks in companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in South Africa. Santella et al (2008) also note that there is limited research which compares national networks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The objective of this paper is to firstly analyse interlocking directorships of the Top 40 companies listed on the JSE using key metrics as per Newman (2003) and Conyon and Muldoon's (2006a) small world theory, and secondly compare the results to research on Italian, French, German, United Kingdom (UK) and US companies performed by Santella et al (2008) The results presented are relevant to stakeholders such as shareholders, directors, employees, trade unions, regulators and the general public who are interested in the nature of the relationships between the boards of companies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

An analysis of director interlocks on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange

Williams¹,

Deodutt

Stainbank

2016

South African Journal of Accounting Research

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Director interlocks, which occur when companies have directors in common, have concerned shareholders, the public and legislators since the early 1900s. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the interlocking directorships of the Top 40 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange using small world theory and compare the results to research on interlocks in Italian, French, German, United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) companies. South Africa was found to be closest to Italy, between the lowdensity models of the UK and the US, and the significantly higher-density models of Germany and France. This suggests that rather than just the two models (low density and high density), there is a continuum currently reflected with the UK and the US at one end, then South Africa and Italy, and then France and Germany at the other end. The presence of directors with multiple directorships indicates that the threats and benefits associated with multiple directorships may exist in South Africa.

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A Comparison of the Director Networks of the Main Listed Companies in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States

Cited by 31 publications

References 19 publications

Communities in Italian corporate networks

Communities in Italian corporate networks

Positive Freedom in Networked Capitalism: An Empirical Analysis

An analysis of director interlocks on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange

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