A comparative analysis of security risk assessment methodologies for the chemical industry

Matteini, Anita; Argenti, Francesca; Salzano, Ernesto; Cozzani, Valerio

doi:10.1016/j.ress.2018.03.001

Cited by 31 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…This can lead to a severe impact on health and safety of people, economy, environmental damages and pollutions, as well as fatalities (CSC, 2018;Matteini, et al, 2018 andMorenoa et al, 2018) in "on-site and/or off-site" seaports' areas.…”

Section: Security Risk Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security risk management: a case of Qalhat liquefied natural gas terminal

Mokhtari

Rahman

Soltani

et al. 2020

MABR

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Purpose At the substantive level, there exists a gap in knowledge about the position of security risk management (i.e. SRM) during the terminals’ operations and management; particularly when there is potential for deliberate anti-security acts. Correspondingly, the purpose of this paper is a need for more practical research to find out the justification for the existence of the SRM and different techniques for its appropriate execution on these logistics infrastructures principally with due regard to the potential requirements in the near future. Design/methodology/approach Both qualitative and quantitative techniques are used in this study incorporating fuzzy set theory and risk assessment matrix to achieve the research objective. Findings A designed SRM framework tailored for Qalhat liquefied petroleum gas (LNG) terminal in Sultanate of Oman was established to manage the security threats which can be resulted from any probable terrorist attacks. Research limitations/implications The limited numbers of experts for the purpose of the addressed SRM are causing challenges in data collection. Practical implications The pressures for enhanced attention to critical infrastructure security have fostered new challenges for petrochemical seaports and terminals (PSTs). These tendencies dictate to maintain comprehensive security regimens that can be integrated with national and international strategies to support the country’s security against terrorism. Originality/value The development of the security risk factor table model in the case of Qalhat LNG Terminal.

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Section: Security Risk Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security risk management: a case of Qalhat liquefied natural gas terminal

Mokhtari

Rahman

Soltani

et al. 2020

MABR

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show abstract

“…(1) Threat analysis, especially for quantification of the threat, is a considerable challenge since it requires a multitude of data and knowledge, and modeling the motivations, intents, characteristics, capabilities, and tactics of adversaries (Baybutt, 2017;Paté-Cornell and Guikema, 2002). Vulnerability analysis requires a detailed understanding of the design and operation of installations and the threat information (Matteini et al, 2018;Moore et al, 2007;Staalduinen et al, 2016). Security measures can improve the capability of installations against attacks but also may change the attackers' strategies because of the intelligent character of the adversaries (Cox, 2009;Cox, 2008;Powell, 2007).…”

Section: R F T V C mentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating safety and security resources to protect chemical industrial parks from man-made domino effects: A dynamic graph approach

Chen

Reniers

Khakzad

2019

Reliability Engineering & System Safety

111

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Chemical industrial parks are susceptible to domino effects triggered by intentional attacks.Previous research on security risk management in chemical and process industries has mainly focused on using security measures to prevent intentional attacks, neglecting the effects of safety barriers. Safety barriers are able to reduce the potential consequences and decrease the attractiveness of chemical industrial parks to terrorists who aim to maximize the damage. From a systematic perspective, the potential consequence of intentional attacks is defined as the expected loss which is the sum-product of damage probability and consequence of all installations. A consequence-based methodology including a Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment Graph (DVSG) model is proposed to integrate safety and security resources for reducing the risk of intentional attacks. The DVAG model is developed based on dynamic graphs, considering the effects of security measures, safety barriers, and emergency response. This methodology can quickly assess the consequences and damage probabilities of all possible intentional attacks so as to mitigate the risk via evaluation and allocation of security measures and safety barriers.

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“…Threat analysis is a considerable challenge since it requires a multitude of data and knowledge and modeling the motivations, intents, characteristics, capabilities, and tactics of adversaries [16,17]. Vulnerability analysis requires a detailed understanding of the design and operation of installations and the threat information [18][19][20]. Security measures can improve the capability of installations against attacks but may change the attackers' strategies because of the intelligent character of the adversaries [21][22][23].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%