Corporate Governance in Developing Economies
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-84833-4_17
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A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance Systems in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela

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Cited by 10 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…The structure of Latin corporate governance is thought a more flexible system of corporate governance associated with the previous systems. In the structure of Latin corporate governance, the BOD can be selected in two ways, one board is like the Anglo-Saxon model or two boards like the Germanic model, and shareholders have further impact in this system (Aguilera, 2009). This model is categorized as an insider model of corporate governance, where the attention of the share is owned by cross-shareholding, financial shareholding, stubborn government ownership and family-based control (Lewis, 1999).…”
Section: Latin Corporate Governance Systemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The structure of Latin corporate governance is thought a more flexible system of corporate governance associated with the previous systems. In the structure of Latin corporate governance, the BOD can be selected in two ways, one board is like the Anglo-Saxon model or two boards like the Germanic model, and shareholders have further impact in this system (Aguilera, 2009). This model is categorized as an insider model of corporate governance, where the attention of the share is owned by cross-shareholding, financial shareholding, stubborn government ownership and family-based control (Lewis, 1999).…”
Section: Latin Corporate Governance Systemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ownership is highly concentrated as 74 percent of publicly traded companies have a controlling shareholder (CFA Institute, ). Most Brazilian companies are controlled by families (Aguilera, ) and a few large public pension funds are significant shareholders in many Brazilian companies. For instance, PREVI, the largest pension fund in the country, managing US$74 billion or 26 percent of the total pension fund assets (ABRAPP, ), holds 10.4 percent of shares at Banco do Brasil (Banco do Brasil, ), 12.26 percent at BRF (BRF, ) and 30 percent at CPFL (CPFL, ).…”
Section: Research Context: Brazil and South Africamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Pelos resultados observados, cerca de 70,0% das ações se concentram nas mãos do maior acionista, chegando a 75,0% no grupo dos cinco maiores acionistas. De acordo com Aguilera (2008), os cinco maiores acionistas argentinos concentravam, em média, 90,0% da propriedade em 2002, fato que demonstra que aquele mercado, apensar de ter maior concentração, também vem apresentando tendência gradual de redução da concentração. apresentam-se seus resultados, primeiro para cada país e, em seguida de toda a amostra inclusive com controle por tamanho e por liquidez.…”
Section: Análise Comparativa Da Estrutura De Propriedade E Controle Nunclassified