A Combined Optimization-Theoretic and Side- Channel Approach for Attacking Strong Physical Unclonable Functions

Liu, Yuntao; Xie, Yang; Bao, Chongxi; Srivastava, Ankur

doi:10.1109/tvlsi.2017.2759731

Cited by 24 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The adapted ML technique successfully attacks the XOR Arbiter-PUFs and Lightweight PUFs for up to 16 XORs and for a bit-length of up to 512 (timing side-channel) and 128 (power side-channel) with a minimum accuracy achieved of 97%. Elsewhere, Liu et al, [46,48] proposed a novel optimizationtheoretic attacking approach to attack Arbiter-PUF, XOR Arbiter-PUF and Memristor-PUF. This approach is composed of two parts.…”

Section: Hybrid Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on the Susceptibility of PUFs to Invasive, Semi-Invasive and Noninvasive Attacks: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Directions

Mispan

Halak

Zwoliński

2021

J CIRCUIT SYST COMP

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Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are considered to be a promising technology that provides a hardware root-of-trust for integrated circuit (IC) applications. PUFs exploit the intrinsic process variations that map a set of challenges to a set of responses. The intrinsic process variations are caused by uncontrollable deviations in the IC manufacturing process, which are unique and random from die to die and wafer to wafer. As the PUF output is device-specific, PUFs can, therefore, be used in IC identification and authentication, and cryptographic key generation. Nevertheless, many different successful attack techniques have already revealed vulnerabilities in certain PUFs, including invasive, semi-invasive and noninvasive attacks. In this work, we survey some of the known attacks on PUFs. We also survey the countermeasures to these types of attack presented in recent literature, and finally, discuss the future challenges. Through this survey, the susceptibility of PUFs to attacks is highlighted and this information may be used to improve the quality of future PUF-based application designs.

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Section: Hybrid Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on the Susceptibility of PUFs to Invasive, Semi-Invasive and Noninvasive Attacks: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Directions

Mispan

Halak

Zwoliński

2021

J CIRCUIT SYST COMP

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“…The core principle for such PUFs is to leverage the process variations inherent to (CMOS) fabrication, through various dedicated circuitry. However, the resulting randomness is limited for most PUF implementations; it may be machine-learned and, thus, cloned [85][86][87][88].…”

Section: Physically-unclonable Functions (Pufs)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware Security For and Beyond CMOS Technology

Knechtel¹

2020

Proceedings of the 2020 International Symposium on Physical Design

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As with most aspects of electronic systems and integrated circuits, hardware security has traditionally evolved around the dominant CMOS technology. However, with the rise of various emerging technologies, whose main purpose is to overcome the fundamental limitations for scaling and power consumption of CMOS technology, unique opportunities arise also to advance the notion of hardware security. In this paper, I first provide an overview on hardware security in general. Next, I review selected emerging technologies, namely (i) spintronics, (ii) memristors, (iii) carbon nanotubes and related transistors, (iv) nanowires and related transistors, and (v) 3D and 2.5D integration. I then discuss their application to advance hardware security and also outline related challenges. CCS CONCEPTS• Security and privacy → Security in hardware; • Hardware → Emerging technologies.

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“…1) "Weak PUFs" are not necessarily inferior to "strong" PUFs [6]. On the contrary, powerful machine learning attacks such as [4]- [7], [32] do not apply for weak PUFs, only for strong PUFs. The main difference between weak and strong PUFs is that the former work on a (few) fixed input(s), or challenge(s), whereas the latter have to support a large range of inputs/challenges.…”

Section: Toward Plasmonics-enhanced Optical Pufs a Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward Physically Unclonable Functions From Plasmonics-Enhanced Silicon Disc Resonators

Knechtel

Gosciniak

Bojesomo

et al. 2019

J. Lightwave Technol.

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The omnipresent digitalization trend has enabled a number of related malicious activities, ranging from data theft to disruption of businesses, counterfeiting of devices, and identity fraud, among others. Hence, it is essential to implement security schemes and to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of electronic circuits. Toward this end, the concept of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) has been established at the beginning of the 21st century. However, most PUFs have eventually, at least partially, fallen short of their promises, which are unpredictability, unclonability, uniqueness, reproducibility, and tamper resilience. That is because most PUFs directly utilize the underlying microelectronics, but that intrinsic randomness can be limited and may thus be predicted, especially by machine learning. Optical PUFs, in contrast, are still considered as promising-they can derive strong, hard-to-predict randomness independently from microelectronics, by using some kind of "optical token." Here we propose a novel concept for plasmonics-enhanced optical PUFs, or peo-PUFs in short. For the first time, we leverage two highly nonlinear phenomena in conjunction by construction: (i) light propagation in a silicon disk resonator, and (ii) surface plasmons arising from nanoparticles arranged randomly on top of the resonator. We elaborate on the physical phenomena, provide simulation results, and conduct a security analysis of peo-PUFs for secure key generation and authentication. This study highlights the good potential of peo-PUFs, and our future work is to focus on fabrication and characterization of such PUFs.

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A Combined Optimization-Theoretic and Side- Channel Approach for Attacking Strong Physical Unclonable Functions

Cited by 24 publications

References 14 publications

A Survey on the Susceptibility of PUFs to Invasive, Semi-Invasive and Noninvasive Attacks: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Directions

A Survey on the Susceptibility of PUFs to Invasive, Semi-Invasive and Noninvasive Attacks: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Directions

Hardware Security For and Beyond CMOS Technology

Toward Physically Unclonable Functions From Plasmonics-Enhanced Silicon Disc Resonators

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