A cognitive architecture that combines internal simulation with a global workspace

Shanahan, Murray

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.005

Cited by 159 publications

(100 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…The paper presents a computer implementation of the architecture that performs a simple form of cognitively mediated action selection. However, the implementation presented in (Shanahan, 2006), though useful as a proof-of-concept, lacks neurological plausibility, both at the level of the neuron model used and in its employment of a single attractor network to model the global workspace.…”

Section: An Internal Sensorimotor Loopmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In (Shanahan, 2006), a cognitive architecture is proposed in which a global workspace is combined with an internally closed sensorimotor loop. The proposal is in support of the hypothesis that organisms whose brains are endowed with such a loop are capable of rehearsing the consequences of potential actions prior to actually carrying them out (Cotterill, 1998;Hesslow, 2002).…”

Section: An Internal Sensorimotor Loopmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A spiking neuron model of cortical broadcast and competition

Shanahan

2008

Consciousness and Cognition

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This paper presents a computer model of cortical broadcast and competition based on spiking neurons and inspired by the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace underlying conscious information processing in the human brain. In the model, the hypothesised workspace is realised by a collection of recurrently inter-connected regions capable of sustaining and disseminating a reverberating spatial pattern of activation. At the same time, the workspace remains susceptible to new patterns arriving from outlying cortical populations. Competition among these cortical populations for influence on the workspace is effected by a combination of mutual inhibition and top-down amplification.

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Section: An Internal Sensorimotor Loopmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: An Internal Sensorimotor Loopmentioning

confidence: 99%

A spiking neuron model of cortical broadcast and competition

Shanahan

2008

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…This concept also inspired models of enactive systems, but emphasize the principle of self-production and self-development. An example is the architecture of the robot iCub , that also includes principles Global Workspace Cognitive Architecture (Shanahan, 2006) and Dynamic Neural Field Architecture (Erlhagen and Bicho, 2006). The underlying assumption is that cognitive processes are entwined with the physical structure of the body and its interaction with the environment, and the cognitive learning is an anticipative skill construction rather than knowledge acquisition.…”

Section: Cognitive Architecturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Affective Human-Humanoid Interaction Through Cognitive Architecture

Infantino¹

2012

The Future of Humanoid Robots - Research and Applications

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“…"global workspace theory" presented in (Baars, 1988(Baars, , 1997) and partially modelled in (Shanahan, 2006), among others, that claim to be sufficiently general to cover all the cases, including many different functions of consciousness, but working models of that theory will probably remain toy demonstrations for a long time, unable to approach human competences. (They may nevertheless be useful in explicating Baars' theory and its implications.)…”

Section: Let's Do Some Phenomenologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal and Access Consciousness and the "Hard" Problem: A View From the Designer Stance

Sloman¹

2010

Int. J. Mach. Conscious.

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aThis paper is an attempt to summarise and justify critical comments I have been making over several decades about research on consciousness by philosophers, scientists and engineers. This includes (a) explaining why the concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (P-C), in the sense defined by Ned Block, is semantically flawed and unsuitable as a target for scientific research or machine modelling, whereas something like the concept of "access consciousness" (A-C) with which it is often contrasted refers to phenomena that can be described and explained within a future scientific theory, and (b) explaining why the "hard problem" is a bogus problem, because of its dependence on the P-C concept. It is compared with another bogus problem, "the 'hard' problem of spatial identity" introduced as part of a tutorial on semantically flawed concepts. Different types of semantic flaw and conceptual confusion not normally studied outside analytical philosophy are distinguished. The semantic flaws of the "zombie" argument, closely allied with the P-C concept are also explained. These topics are related both to the evolution of human and animal minds and brains and to requirements for human-like robots. The diversity of the phenomena related to the concept "consciousness" as ordinarily used makes it a polymorphic concept, partly analogous to concepts like "efficient", "sensitive", and "impediment" all of which need extra information to be provided before they can be applied to anything, and then the criteria of applicability differ. As a result there cannot be one explanation of consciousness, one set of neural associates of consciousness, one explanation for the evolution of consciousness, nor one machine model of consciousness. We need many of each. I present a way of making progress based on what McCarthy called "the designer stance", using facts about running virtual machines, without which current computers obviously could not work. I suggest the same is true of biological minds, because biological evolution long ago "discovered" a need for something like virtual machinery for selfmonitoring and self-extending information processing systems, and produced far more sophisticated versions than human engineers have so far achieved.a Available in two formats, PDF and HTML at

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A cognitive architecture that combines internal simulation with a global workspace

Cited by 159 publications

References 59 publications

A spiking neuron model of cortical broadcast and competition

A spiking neuron model of cortical broadcast and competition

Affective Human-Humanoid Interaction Through Cognitive Architecture

Phenomenal and Access Consciousness and the "Hard" Problem: A View From the Designer Stance

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