Phenomenal and Access Consciousness and the "Hard" Problem: A View From the Designer Stance

Abstract

aThis paper is an attempt to summarise and justify critical comments I have been making over several decades about research on consciousness by philosophers, scientists and engineers. This includes (a) explaining why the concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (P-C), in the sense defined by Ned Block, is semantically flawed and unsuitable as a target for scientific research or machine modelling, whereas something like the concept of "access consciousness" (A-C) with which it is often contrasted refers to phenomena that can be described and explained within a future scientific theory, and (b) explaining why the "hard problem" is a bogus problem, because of its dependence on the P-C concept. It is compared with another bogus problem, "the 'hard' problem of spatial identity" introduced as part of a tutorial on semantically flawed concepts. Different types of semantic flaw and conceptual confusion not normally studied outside analytical philosophy are distinguished. The semantic flaws of the "zombie" argument, closely allied with the P-C concept are also explained. These topics are related both to the evolution of human and animal minds and brains and to requirements for human-like robots. The diversity of the phenomena related to the concept "consciousness" as ordinarily used makes it a polymorphic concept, partly analogous to concepts like "efficient", "sensitive", and "impediment" all of which need extra information to be provided before they can be applied to anything, and then the criteria of applicability differ. As a result there cannot be one explanation of consciousness, one set of neural associates of consciousness, one explanation for the evolution of consciousness, nor one machine model of consciousness. We need many of each. I present a way of making progress based on what McCarthy called "the designer stance", using facts about running virtual machines, without which current computers obviously could not work. I suggest the same is true of biological minds, because biological evolution long ago "discovered" a need for something like virtual machinery for selfmonitoring and self-extending information processing systems, and produced far more sophisticated versions than human engineers have so far achieved.a Available in two formats, PDF and HTML at

Sensorimotor Theory and Enactivism

“…The idea then is that qualia may be absent or systematically different without any noticeable difference in the interaction of the system with its environment. Arguably, such accounts of consciousness that appeal to interaction-independent inner processes (or in the case of Chalmers, independent natural laws) are subject to the objection of 'semantic disengagement', implying that they rely on a notion of consciousness that lacks any significant use -it cannot be used to say anything substantial (Sloman 2010).…”

Do Artificial Reinforcement-Learning Agents Matter Morally?

“…Rather, a brain has many characteristics, and it becomes gradually more important with its degree of sophistication. Sloman [2010] notes that 'consciousness' is what he calls a 'polymorphic concept' in the sense that it can refer to many different particular things depending on the context. As a result, he says of consciousness: 'there cannot be a unitary explanation of [...] how the brain produces "it", nor a time at which "it" first exists in a foetus,' but, rather, 'The different phenomena falling under the polymorphic umbrella can be investigated separately [...].…”

“…My reply is that those subsystems may indeed be conscious to themselves. As Sloman [2010] notes: 'a part of a whole animal or robot [may be] conscious of something that causes it to alter its (internal) behaviour [...] while the whole animal is not introspectively conscious of it.' It's true that those subsystems are not having significant influence on the parts of your brain that win control of slow and deliberative actions, store longlasting memories, and verbalise your subjective experiences.…”

Consciousness, Action Selection, Meaning and Phenomenic Anticipation

“…However as indicated by Sloman [2010], these multiple e®orts may miss the target of a uni¯ed theory of consciousness: \. .…”

“…Access consciousness seems to be the main target, leaving phenomenality to further clari¯cations of the hard problem [Chalmers, 1996]. Indeed, Sloman [2010] suggests that the main di±culty that we confront in research on consciousness and machine consciousness is related to this very polymorphic nature of the consciousness concept. Sloman analysis may seem to imply that trying to tackle several aspects of consciousness À À À access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, self-awareness, etc.…”