A clarification of Heidegger's phenomenology.

Abstract

Naturalizing Phenomenology referred to the book Naturalizing Phenomenology (Petitot, Varela, Pachoud, & Roy, 1999). Three aspects of it that Kendler did not discuss but that invite necessary examination for clarification of the relationship between psychology (especially cognitive psychology) and phenomenology are the issue of mathematics, the concern for temporality, and the theoretical dialogue between the natural science approach and the phenomenological approach that takes place throughout that book.The "naturalization" project of the book is inclusionary. The editors, who are the authors of the first chapter of the book, state in that chapter that the contributors of the three last articles "illustrate a more skeptical attitude about the very possibility of naturalizing Husserlian phenomenology" (Petitot et al., 1999, p. 80). Two of those three contributors "argue on the basis of a close examination of Husserl's theory that Husserlianism cannot be naturalized without losing precisely what makes it valuable from either a descriptive or a philosophical point of view" (Petitot et al., 1999, p. 80). The four editors of this extraordinary book are affiliated with French universities. Of the 22 contributors to the volume, only 5 teach at American universities. The book is a model for American psychologists who propose to clarify psychology and phenomenology-both those whose conviction is that psychological research should be "naturalized" and those whose commitment is to the qualitative research tradition of human science. ConclusionKendler (2005) advocated the "moral pluralism" of democracy. A similar position of advocacy for "methodological pluralism" is required (cf. Farber, 1967, p. 6). Recognition and respectful consideration of other methodologies in psychology advance the discipline and safeguard against intellectual parochialism and prejudice.

Friend or fiend? An interpretative phenomenological analysis of moral and relational orientation in authentic leadership

“…So, to be perceived as authentic by others, the leader must demonstrate a temporally fluid consistency in their decisions and actions, with no dramatic or jarring shifts, that are, in turn, attributed to an underlying, morally grounded ‘call of conscience’ (Varga, 2011: 74) that is relationally focused. This explanation of ‘being true’ as a call of conscience is an integral aspect of Heidegger’s view of authenticity as a human capacity to discern meaning from lived experience and make responsible ‘Being-in-the-world’ choices (Paley, 2000), rather than ‘a prescriptive admonition to live by supposedly “objectively right” values’ (Garza, 2006: 255).…”

Mending fences: Defining the domains and approaches of quantitative and qualitative research.

“…Although we argue that neither method holds a privileged perspective on the world, these two modes of description are distinguished, for the most part, by their respective approaches. We hold that no inquiry can be undertaken from a perspective-less position (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962) and thus even natural science is not value free (see Kendler, 2005 who asserts this and Garza, 2006, who refutes this position). Indeed, we would hold that an explicit acknowledgment of approach is necessary to assess the validity of any inquiry (Churchill, Lowery, McNally, & Rao, 1998; Garza, 2004).…”

“…Both types of research have a set of usually implicit philosophical suppositions (see Churchill & Wertz, 2002; Garza, 2004, 2007, 2011; Giorgi, 2009; von Eckartsberg, 1998; Wertz, 1985). Among others, Garza (2006) and Giorgi (2009) suggest that important differences exist between these two approaches to research. Following Giorgi, such differences would define different domains of research motivated by fundamentally different questions and producing fundamentally different knowledge claims.…”

Views from the inside and outside.

“…Four (Cloonan, 2006, Garza, 2006, Olson, 2006, Schneider, 2006, this issue) of the five comments on my article (Kendler, May–June 2005) were critical of my treatment of psychology and phenomenology. I will try to identify the sources of these disputes, but not with the intention of demonstrating the superiority of one discipline over the other.…”

“…Criticism of my lumping them together can be considered off the mark because phenomenology and humanistic psychology, although substantively different, are methodologically similar, which was the primary focus of my article (Kendler, 2005). In addition, it should not be a source of surprise that phenomenology, when perceived through a methodological lens, loses some of its phenomenological experiential qualities (Cloonan, 2006; Garza, 2006; Olson, 2006).…”