A Brief (Hi)Story of Just-So Stories in Evolutionary Science

Abstract

In this essay, I examine the usage of the term “just-so story.” I attempt to show that just-so storytelling can be seen as an epistemic concept that, in various ways, tackles the epistemological and methodological problems relating to evolutionary explanations qua historical/narrative explanations. I identify two main, yet mutually exclusive, strategies of employing the concept of a just-so story: a negative strategy and a positive strategy. Subsequently, I argue that these strategies do not satisfactorily capture the core of the “original” meaning advanced by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin at the end of the 1970s. I revisit the foundation(s) of their anti-adaptationist critique in order to reframe it as a critique of distinctive methodological manners and epistemic maxims related to historical inquiry. Last but not least, I suggest that contemporary evolutionary thinkers have two conceptually different options: they can either adhere to the “original” meaning of the term “just-so story” or accept that “just-so story” is a term equivalent to “implausible narrative explanation.”

Events, narrative and data: why new chronologies or ethically Bayesian approaches should change how we write archaeology

“…This process recalls the ways in which data and explanatory narratives are related in other disciplines (cf. Hubálek, 2021).…”

The Evolutionary Function of Awe: A Review and Integrated Model of Seven Theoretical Perspectives

“…This adaptationist perspective has been criticized to prematurely accept narratives of evolutionary functions, without sufficient evidence and without the consideration of alternative explanations (Andrews et al, 2002). Adaptationist accounts of evolution have been referred to as “just-so-stories,” which in a derogatory or negative sense is taken to mean, a speculative, unproven, and unscientific account of an evolutionary function (Hubálek, 2020). In a more positive sense, the term is used to refer to evolutionary hypotheses, emphasizing the need for further empirical research to validate or falsify the hypothesized evolutionary functions (Hubálek, 2020).…”

“…Adaptationist accounts of evolution have been referred to as “just-so-stories,” which in a derogatory or negative sense is taken to mean, a speculative, unproven, and unscientific account of an evolutionary function (Hubálek, 2020). In a more positive sense, the term is used to refer to evolutionary hypotheses, emphasizing the need for further empirical research to validate or falsify the hypothesized evolutionary functions (Hubálek, 2020). This paper draws from the latter interpretation of the term, viewing adaptations as hypotheses to be verified or disproven (Fitch, 2012).…”

Chronicle, Genealogy and Narrative: Understanding Synthetic Biology in the Image of Historiography

“…If narrative is a constitutive feature of scientific knowledge then perhaps the making of historical and scientific knowledge is more similar than has otherwise been assumed or allowed. For historians and philosophers who have investigated the so-called historical sciences, most prominently geology, palaeontology, evolutionary biology and natural history (Currie 2018;Cleland 2011;Rudwick 1985;Gallie 1955;Richards 1992;Hubálek 2021), or who have attended to science's archival practices (Daston 2017;Strasser 2019;Leonelli 2016), such similarities might already seem obvious. 1 But the approach taken here extends beyond these bounds.…”