A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics

Jolls, Christine; Sunstein, Cass R.; Thaler, Richard H.

doi:10.2307/1229304

Cited by 926 publications

(365 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…13. For behavioral research in the field of international law, see Broude 2015;Galbraith 2013;Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler 1998;Poulsen 2013;Sitaraman and Zionts 2015;van Aaken 2014. 14. For example, see research on leaders by Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005 and on time horizons by Edelstein 2002 andKrebs andRapport 2012. 15.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations

Hafner-Burton¹,

Haggard²,

Lake³

et al. 2017

Int Org

204

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations

Hafner-Burton¹,

Haggard²,

Lake³

et al. 2017

Int Org

204

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“…Our results thus suggest that behavioral factors have an important role to play in environmental enforcement. Such behavioral factors have been slow to influence environmental enforcement despite a strong behavioral law and economics tradition (Jolls et al, 1998), as well as growing policy application in other regulatory settings. 2 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.…”

Section: Expectation As the Hypothesis Of Initial Penalty Neutralitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More recent and salient events, such as being punished, are the most available (easiest) to recall. Jolls et al (1998Jolls et al ( , p. 1537 point out "that vivid and personal information will often be more effective than statistical evidence" in changing behavior. 7…”

Section: Experiential Deterrencementioning

confidence: 99%

Can Punishment Generate Specific Deterrence Without Updating? Analysis of a Stated Choice Scenario

Earnhart

Friesen

2013

Environ Resource Econ

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This study explores the specific deterrence generated by punishment in the context of regulatory violations with a focus on the distinction between upward revisions to future punishment parameters -likelihood and severity -and the experience of being penalized. In order to avoid the pitfalls of empirically analyzing actual choices made by regulated entities, e.g., measuring entities' beliefs regarding the likelihood and size of future penalties, our study examines behavior associated with a stated choice scenario presented within a survey distributed to the environmental managers of facilities regulated under the U.S. Clean Water Act. This choice of respondents strengthens the external validity of our empirical results. Based on a variety of statistical methods, our empirical results strongly and robustly reject the standard hypothesis that specific deterrence stems solely from upward revisions to punishment parameters while supporting the alternative hypothesis of experiential deterrence, whereby facilities focus on recent experiences to shape their compliance behavior.

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“…And this response seems to be expected and anticipated by proposers; they typically offer a substantial portion of the sum to be divided -ordinarily forty to fifty percent. See Güth et al (1982, 367, 371-72, 375 tbls.4 & 5); Kahneman et al (1986, S285, S291 tbl.2), summarized in Jolls et al (1998). 22 In fact, already a subject having the joint combination of the smallest degree of envy and guilt (α = 0.5, β = Therefore, we formulate our second hypotheses as follows: Hypothesis 2: The reduced cost of self-reporting leads to more reports under asymmetric punishment.…”

Section: Behavioral Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery

Engel

Goerg

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery, one may wonder which punishment strategy is more effective in curbing corruption. For this purpose, we designed and ran a lab experiment in Bonn (Germany) and Shanghai (China) with exactly the same design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment recipients are less likely to grant the socially undesirable favor, while bribers are more likely to report to the authorities with asymmetric punishment. In addition, when punishment was asymmetric, corrupt offers were significantly more likely in Shanghai, but not in Bonn. Our results suggest a tradeoff between deterrence and law enforcement. In a forward-looking perspective, lawmakers must decide which aim carries more weight.

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A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics

Cited by 926 publications

References 26 publications

The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations

The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations

Can Punishment Generate Specific Deterrence Without Updating? Analysis of a Stated Choice Scenario

Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery

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