9. IUU Fishing In Antarctic Waters: CCAMLR Actions And Regulations

Abstract

The vast marine area around the Antarctic continent and sub-Antarctic islandsthe Southern Ocean-has been particularly affected by illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 1 fishing for Patagonian Toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) since the mid-1990s. The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), 2 established by the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR Convention), 3 has responsibility for fisheries management in the area. In this chapter, we outline CCAMLR's experiences in combating IUU fishing over the past decade and a half. Our analysis provides a brief history-* The views expressed in this chapter do not reflect the official views or decisions of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). The first author thanks the Fridtjof Nansen Institute for financial assistance for his participation in the conference 'The World Ocean in Globalisation: Challenges for Marine Regions'. In preparing this chapter, we have benefited greatly from discussions with, and input from, D.

Toothfish crises, actor diversity and the emergence of compliance mechanisms in the Southern Ocean

“…These countries were generally identified as countries leading efforts to reduce IUU fishing. The involvement of states (or their nationals) in IUU fishing has resulted in coordinated diplomatic pressure (where these countries has taken a leading role), forcing countries to take actions against their nationals or vessels in order to maintain credibility (Baird, 2006;Miller et al, Table 3 Coalitions involved in addressing IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean, the costs and benefits to actors of participating in the coalition and the effect of the coalition on noncompliance. Effects on IUU operators are described as an increase (+) or decrease (À) in Price: P, Cost of Fishing: CoF, Probability of Detection: PoD, Cost of Sanctioning: CoS, and Moral and Social Driver: MSD, see (Young, 1979;Sumaila et al, 2006).…”

“…A 1999 proposal (primarily developed by the US, Australia and the EU) aimed at tracing trade flows, became operational in 2000, in part due to pressure from NGOs (Agnew, 2000). This Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) provided a mechanism for excluding IUU catches from the market, thereby reducing the price for IUU caught fish (Agnew, 2000;Miller et al, 2010). Several NCPs have been identified as important in the landing or trade of toothfish, and some have also become members of the CDS .…”

“…We operate freely across our respective zones and we can share the cost, which would have been enormous for one country alone.'' Individual states with a high degree of autonomy have thus developed compliance mechanisms independent from CCAMLR, with a strong focus on enforcement (see also, e.g., CCAMLR, 2002;Miller et al, 2010) for a description of unilateral actions taken by the US to ban suspected IUU products). CCAMLR was also able to innovate during this period.…”

“…CCAMLR was also able to innovate during this period. The CDS became effective as initial loopholes were addressed (CCAMLR, 2001;Miller et al, 2010). The CCAMLR IUU vessel list, established in 2003, was closely coupled to the CDS and CCAMLR VMS and constituted another important enforcement mechanism .…”

“…There is thus a strong social-ecological feedback between IUU fishing-stock status-scientific advice and long-term economic outcomes for the licensed fishing industry, which could be of relevance also for other management systems. CCAMLR has emerged as a global leader in addressing IUU fishing and similar approaches to the CCAMLR CDS and IUU list are currently being developed elsewhere (Flothmann et al, 2010;Miller et al, 2010).…”