“…(2015,5) What is here of special importance, however, is that although I have no direct phenomenological experience of a cross-temporal identity of the self as something that lasts "from thought to thought" (Strawson 2017, 35), frequent gaps in the stream of consciousness, such as dreamless sleep, cannot weaken my awareness of this enduring self just as changes within our minds and bodies are incapable of so doing. Squire et al (1981), Tulving (1993), Klein et al (2002), Rathbone et al (2014), and Dorahy et al (2021) refer to cases of patients suffering from severe memory impairments, dissociative identity disorder, and cognitive impairments, who despite a loss of "access to a variety of self-relevant sources of knowledge" (Klein 2012, 478) possessed a coherent sense of self which had not collapsed under the weight of cognitive disorders. But if this is the case, then terms like the "loss of self", 38 "damaged self", or "loss of sense of personal identity" are rather hyperbole and constructions suffering from a lack of distinction between the "self" and "selfconcept", "self-image", "the autobiographical self", "the narrative self", and so on.…”