2014
DOI: 10.1080/13554794.2014.977923
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Self, memory, and imagining the future in a case of psychogenic amnesia

Abstract: We report a case of psychogenic amnesia and examine the relationships between autobiographical memory impairment, the self, and ability to imagine the future. Case study JH, a 60-year-old male, experienced a 6-year period of pervasive psychogenic amnesia covering all life events from childhood to the age of 53. JH was tested during his amnesic period and again following hypnotherapy and the recovery of his memories. JH's amnesia corresponded with deficits in self-knowledge and imagining the future. Results are… Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Self trait knowledge has held a prominent role in the notion that the self-concept may depend on autobiographical memory (Conway, 2005;Prebble et al, 2013;Rathbone et al, 2015). It is therefore interesting that HML040 appears to provide evidence that fundamental access to the self can be spared in the face of impairment to self trait knowledge.…”
Section: A Subjective Self Without Self Trait Knowledge?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Self trait knowledge has held a prominent role in the notion that the self-concept may depend on autobiographical memory (Conway, 2005;Prebble et al, 2013;Rathbone et al, 2015). It is therefore interesting that HML040 appears to provide evidence that fundamental access to the self can be spared in the face of impairment to self trait knowledge.…”
Section: A Subjective Self Without Self Trait Knowledge?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(2015,5) What is here of special importance, however, is that although I have no direct phenomenological experience of a cross-temporal identity of the self as something that lasts "from thought to thought" (Strawson 2017, 35), frequent gaps in the stream of consciousness, such as dreamless sleep, cannot weaken my awareness of this enduring self just as changes within our minds and bodies are incapable of so doing. Squire et al (1981), Tulving (1993), Klein et al (2002), Rathbone et al (2014), and Dorahy et al (2021) refer to cases of patients suffering from severe memory impairments, dissociative identity disorder, and cognitive impairments, who despite a loss of "access to a variety of self-relevant sources of knowledge" (Klein 2012, 478) possessed a coherent sense of self which had not collapsed under the weight of cognitive disorders. But if this is the case, then terms like the "loss of self", 38 "damaged self", or "loss of sense of personal identity" are rather hyperbole and constructions suffering from a lack of distinction between the "self" and "selfconcept", "self-image", "the autobiographical self", "the narrative self", and so on.…”
Section: The Relevance Of the First-person Perspectivementioning
confidence: 99%
“…But evidence from clinical studies suggests that it is difficult to identify a circumscribed neuronal instantiation of the self. Certain transient forms of amnesia such as Dissociative Fugue or the Psychogenic Amnesia, for instance, can go along with a reversible distortion or loss of one’s sense of self while not showing any substantial organic brain damage (e.g., Coons, 1999; Rathbone, Ellis, Baker, & Butler, 2015). Studies such as these hence implicate a dissociation between the brain and the self and indicate how difficult it is to advance an understanding of the self as “aris[ing] in the brain” (Metzinger, 2009).…”
Section: Third-person Approaches Do Not Capture the Core Of The Selfmentioning
confidence: 99%