Exploring the Behavioral, Experiential, and Conceptual Dimensions of 					the Self

Weger, Ulrich; Meyer, Andreas; Wagemann, Johannes

doi:10.1027/1016-9040/a000263

Cited by 29 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(48 reference statements)

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“…The systematic training of introspective competencies has been revealed to be an effective way of improving introspection. Weger et al (2016) demonstrate how such training improves first-person access to one's mental processes. They implemented five exercises based on meditative concentration.…”

Section: Training Of the Subject's Introspective Competenciesmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Here, the training of the subject's introspective competencies is one of the most promising ways of improving a subject's access to conceptual knowledge. Previous research has revealed that the systematic training of introspective competencies succeeds in improving first-person access to one's own mental processes (Weger et al, 2016). On the other hand, it has not been recently clear how introspective reporting may be biased by the specific styles of training introspective competencies.…”

Section: Elimination Of Attentional Attributional Conceptual and Ementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Via introspection, we shift our attention to selected features of consciousness. Weger et al (2016) propose that the method of introspection should be described as clearly as possible in order to make first-person research fully transparent. 6…”

Section: Philosophical Roots Of Introspectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such sharing of one's first-person experience is suggested to be able to prevent the unexpected and involuntary biases that may arise from different expectations and prejudices (Ziegler & Weger 2018a). The mutual reporting of experiences enables the mutual influencing, sharpening, and mirroring of individual selfobservations (Weger, Meyer, & Wagemann, 2016). Intersubjective consensus and sharing are suggested to be very helpful for the elimination of expressional errors that may arise from the difficulty of reliably expressing the description of mental processes using natural language.…”

Section: The Sharing Of Introspective Experience Between Subjectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Elimination of bias in introspection: Methodological advances, refinements, and recommendations

Trnka

Smelik

2020

New Ideas in Psychology

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Building on past constructive criticism, the present study provides further methodological development focused on the elimination of bias that may occur during first-person observation. First, various sources of errors that may accompany introspection are distinguished based on previous critical literature. Four main errors are classified, namely attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error. Furthermore, methodological recommendations for the possible elimination of these errors have been determined based on the analysis and focused excerpting of introspective scientific literature. The following groups of methodological recommendations were determined: 1) a better focusing of the subject's attention to their mental processes, 2) providing suitable stimuli, and 3) the sharing of introspective experience between subjects. Furthermore, the potential of adjustments in introspective research designs for eliminating attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error is discussed.

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Section: Training Of the Subject's Introspective Competenciesmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Elimination Of Attentional Attributional Conceptual and Ementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Philosophical Roots Of Introspectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Sharing Of Introspective Experience Between Subjectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Elimination of bias in introspection: Methodological advances, refinements, and recommendations

Trnka

Smelik

2020

New Ideas in Psychology

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“…What we have been doing in experimental psychology, however, is largely keeping our standards unchanged and imposing them on a phenomenon that is not really done justice through these third‐person methods. In turn, phenomena that have a primary first‐person or qualia character such as mind wandering (but also other phenomena, e.g., consciousness or the self) are ultimately misunderstood or only partially understood, as we will outline later on (see also Weger, Meyer, & Wagemann, ). New methods are needed to deal with such phenomena.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Researching mind wandering from a first‐person perspective

Weger

Wagemann

Meyer³

2018

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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Mind wandering is an inherently inner (or first-person) phenomenon that leaves few direct traces for third-person enquiry. Nonetheless, psychologists often study mind wandering using third-person (e.g., behavioral or neuronal) research methods. And although research-participants may well be asked to introspect on their mind wandering experiences (e.g., via experience-sampling or think-aloud techniques), such introspective self-observations typically lack methodological rigor and are hence of only preliminary value. Here, we argue that it is a missed opportunity to not train researchers to introspect on their own mind-wandering experiences to better understand the associated mental processes. We propose a novel approach to cultivating an educated form of introspection in the study of attentional focusing and mind wandering. Our research adds to the current theoretical understanding by explicating conditions that facilitate mind wandering (e.g., the shifting and broadening of concepts) and help find the way back to the primary task (e.g., commitment; deliberate shifts between focusing and defocusing). /journal/acp approach that we propose will deal with these challenges and also present data from a pilot trial to substantiate this approach. We consider this discussion as an important extension not only to the mindwandering literature but also to the study of various other phenomena in cognitive psychology and beyond, especially with regard to their qualitative (or qualia) components (Mandler, 2005;Shoemaker, 1991). Smallwood and Schooler (2015) identify three challenges to the study of mind wandering, which we take up and connect to in the following sections. The first of these challenges is the difficulty of exercising experimental control over the onset and occurrence of mind wandering; in the absence of such control, it is difficult to identify the precursors or even the triggers of mind wandering, hence complicating a systematic analysis of the characteristics of this psychological state. The second difficulty is the circumstance that as an inherently internal phenomenon, mind wandering constitutes itself in the form of a first-person experience that happens "at its own convenience"and that can only be indirectly inferred from third-person observation.As a matter of fact, given its primarily qualitative or first-person nature, not much is left to the third-person observer of mind wandering to begin with other than the indirect and hence secondary and in fact somewhat peripheral aspects of the mind-wandering phenomenon.Its primary quality is-by its very nature-elusive to a third-person point of view. Related to this, a third challenge lies in the fact that information about mind wandering typically depends on self-report measures that are widely perceived to be subjective and biased and that are claimed to alter the occurrence of the primary phenomenon -here, mind wandering-to begin with (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015).Given the importance and prevalence of mind wandering, substantial efforts have been made nonethe...

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Subjectifying the Personality State: Theoretical Underpinnings and an Empirical Example

2020

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Recent developments in personality research highlight the value of modelling dynamic state-like manifestations of personality. The present work integrates these developments with prominent clinical models addressing within-person multiplicity and promotes the exploration of models centred on state-like manifestations of personality that function as cohesive organizational units. Such units possess distinct subjective qualities and are characterized by specific affects, behaviours, cognitions, and desires that tend to be co-activated. As background, we review both theory and research from the fields of social cognition, psychotherapy, and psychopathology that serve as the foundation for such models. We then illustrate our ideas in greater detail with one well-supported clinical model-the schema therapy mode model, chosen because it provides a finite and definite set of modes (i.e. cohesive personality states). We assessed these modes using a newly developed experience-sampling measure administered to 52 individuals (four times daily for 15 days). We estimated intraindividual and group-level temporal and contemporaneous networks based on the within-person variance as well as between-person network. We discuss findings from exemplar participants and from group-level networks and address cross-model particularities and consistencies. In conclusion, we consider potential idiographic and nomothetic applications of subjective states dynamic personality research based on intensive longitudinal methods.

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Exploring the Behavioral, Experiential, and Conceptual Dimensions of the Self

Cited by 29 publications

References 32 publications

Elimination of bias in introspection: Methodological advances, refinements, and recommendations

Elimination of bias in introspection: Methodological advances, refinements, and recommendations

Researching mind wandering from a first‐person perspective

Subjectifying the Personality State: Theoretical Underpinnings and an Empirical Example

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